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There's a predator that came, like a disease, with the European to the tribes
that were here on this land. Columbus was a virus representing a diseased
spirit that affects human perceptions.
We need to evolve past the disease. There is an antibiotic to it. It is us. It's our




The people that fled a ravaged Europe brought to America an un-
healthy belief that it was permissible to involuntarily exploit or annex
the lands of another people (usually of another deeper color) and to
take without consent political control over those people, displacing
their way of life and governance. 2
This belief and its manifestation in the colonization of one people
by another is the foundation of federal Indian law and it is perpetu-
ated in the current law that distributes legal power, sovereignty, or
jurisdiction between the Indian nations, the federal government, and
the states.3
This Article will not explore in depth the assertion that federal In-
dian law is rooted in colonialism and racism. Other scholars have
made this argument and the reader should look to them to consider
1. John Trudell, Refugees in a Land Without Refugee Camps, NEB. HUMAN., Sum-
mer 1994, at 2.
2. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 86 (1993) (proposing an
understanding of colonialism); see also ALBERT MEmmi, Attempt at a Definition, in
DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARD A PORTRAIT, 185-89 (1968) (describing racism as
stressing real or imagined differences, valuing these to the advantage of the ra-
cist, generalizing these as absolutes, and using them to justify aggression and
privilege of the racist).
3. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's Perpetua-
tion of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B.
NEWs & J., 358-69 (1992); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Tra-
ditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 237 (1989).
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the truth of the matter.4 Here the focus will be on the power to deter-
mine membership in the Indian nations, particularly what Anglo law
calls naturalization. The power to determine membership is at the
heart of sovereignty. What is found in this heart will most likely be
spread throughout the body.
"The courts have consistently recognized that one of an Indian
tribe's most basic powers is the authority to determine questions of its
own membership."5 The Native nations may seemingly grant, deny,
revoke, or change the rights and obligations of membership at wiMl.6
As with every legal proposition, however, there are exceptions.
Whatever the Indian sovereign may decide as to the membership
rights of any particular person for purposes of the Native nation, fed-
eral Indian law usually requires some quantum of Indian blood or de-
scent before recognition of the person as a citizen or member of the
nation for purposes of questions of Indian sovereignty. That is, there
is a racial criteria at the center of federal recognition of membership
in an Indian nation whenever that membership is raised in the con-
text of which nation's law shall apply to a controversy.
Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by becoming
a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the laws of the United States
remained unchanged and undiminished. He was still a white man, of the
white race, and therefore not within the exception in the act of Congress. 7
At the center of sovereignty is the power to define the criteria of
national citizenship and its rights and obligations. Currently there is
considerable discussion about this matter within the United States.8
4. Williams, supra note 3, at 358-69; see ROBERT A. WILLIAmIs, JR., THE AmERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DIscouRsEs OF CONQUEST (1990);
Steven Paul McSloy, "Because the Bible Tells Me So": Manifest Destiny and Amer-
ican Indians, 9 ST. THoiavs L. Rev. 37 (1996); Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence
of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, John-
son v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 303
(1993); Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal
Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219.
5. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 20 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
6. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Cherokee Intermar-
riage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Roffv. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
7. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (holding that a white
adopted Cherokee was not an Indian for purpose of exclusive Cherokee jurisdic-
tion for Indian on Indian crimes).
8. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AIERICAN: IMfIGRATION
& hmGRANT POLIcY (1997); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETwEEN PRINCI-
PLEs AND POLITICS: THE DIRECTIONS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP POLICY (1998) (discuss-
ing current policy debates of U.S. citizenship in the areas of citizenship
acquisition, loss of citizenship, implications of dual citizenship, and differential
treatment of citizens and aliens); PETER H. ScHucK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND
IN-BETwEENs: ESSAYS ON IMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998) (examining the
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And, in recent years the number of people seeking naturalization has
reached new heights.9 In this context the chair of the U.S. Commis-
sion on Immigration Reform, Barbara Jordan, called for programs to
"Americanize" new immigrants hoping to reclaim the word and the
process of its manifestation from the racists and xenophobes who had
tarnished its reputation in the 1920s.1O
Several scholars from a variety of disciplines discussed the imphca-
tions of the notion of Americanization of naturalized citizens and the
meaning of American national identity in a recent collection of essays,
Immigration and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century." Professor
Charles Kesler argued for a conception of citizenship that stresses
agreed upon concepts such as a work ethic, affection for the Constitu-
tion, and a common language which might overcome the threat of divi-
sion in multiculturalism by consolidated public opinion expressed in
broad principles.' 2 For Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, less may
be more. He seemed to believe that balkanization is a less serious
threat than the coercion of moral sentiment and that the liberal vision
of making up your own life should trump a requirement to know the
plot of Moby Dick.'3 And so it went as a dozen scholars batted around
the plate of citizenship issues.
None of the essays, whether seeking more or less in the process of
naturalization, a thinner or thicker notion of national identity, dual or
single citizenship, argued for any explicit racial criteria. Neverthe-
less, such criteria may be implied in the statements of others in the
citizenship debates. For instance, Professor Pickus quoted Peter
Brimelow: "[A] nation-state is 'a sovereign structure that is the politi-
cal expression of a specific ethno-cultural group.'"i 4 And, Pickus re-
ferred to the remarks of Patrick Buchanan asking whether a million
Zulus or Englishmen would more easily assimilate into Virginia.' 5 If
immigration system today, the courts and immigration, the politics of immigra-
tion, citizenship and community, and current policy debates involving citizen-
ship); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN
U.S. HISTORY (1997) (examining the development of American citizenship laws
and the influence of politically influenced civic ideals on those laws).
9. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1996 STATIS-
TICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 146 (1997).
10. Barbara Jordan, The Americanization Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at A14.
11. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Noah M. J. Pickus
ed., 1998) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY].
12. See Charles R. Kesler, The Promise of American Citizenship, in TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY, supra note 11, at 3.
13. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Citizenship in Theory and Practice: A Response to
Charles Kesler, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 11, at 41, 46.
14. Noah M. J. Pickus, To Make Natural: Creating Citizens for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 11, at 107, 113 (quoting Peter




these statements urge explicit racial criteria for United States citizen-
ship, then the authors, at least, believe their refutation is self-evident
in current American political speech even if not in habits of mind and
action. They will not be further discussed here.
What will be discussed is whether or not federal Indian law would
or should recognize an adopted or naturalized member of an Indian
nation, particularly one who is without any Indian blood or descent, as
a citizen thereof when the question arises in the context of Indian sov-
ereignty. And, a foundational question of sovereignty is jurisdiction;
which nation's law shall apply? Descent and blood quantum are a par-
ticularly European fascination used most often to justify and maintain
the oppression of others.1 6 Like colonialism, its hand-maiden, racism
is generally prohibited among the world's nations. As a result:
[S]ubterfuge designed to create false appearances are an essential aspect of
maintaining and perfecting the order of colonial rule. Hence, it is necessary
for the colonizer not merely to preempt the sovereignty of the colonized, but to
co-opt it, inculcating a comprador consciousness among some segment of the
subaltern population in which the forms of dominion imposed by colonization
will be advocated as a self-determining expression of will emanating from the
colonized themselves.
1 7
The United States would not refuse to recognize a citizen of France
because that citizen was of Asian descent, nor refuse to recognize a
person with African blood as a citizen of China, nor a person of Euro-
pean ancestry as a citizen of Kenya. If, in matters of American Indian
sovereignty, federal Indian law refuses to recognize an adopted or nat-
uralized member of a Native nation who is without some Indian blood
or descent, then one should ask whether this disrespect of sovereign
power is anything more than a mask for colonialism and racism.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will recount the his-
tory of naturalization in England, its American colonies, and the
United States. Part II will describe historical naturalization processes
in Native nations as told by historians of the nations. Part III will
examine the federal Indian law that responds to questions of Indian
citizenship in matters of sovereign jurisdiction. It will be seen that
race and blood are at the center of federal Indian jurisprudence in a
way that the United States has outgrown in other contexts and that
16. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1996).
17. Ward Churchill, The Crucible of American Indian Identity: Native Tradition ver-
sus Colonial Imposition in Postconquest North America, in CoNTEIn'oRARY NA-
TIV A mRICAN CuLTuRAL IssuEs 39, 40 (Duane Champagne ed., 1999). Professor
Churchill is not a stranger to the crucible of identity. See generally Paul De
Main, Sovereignty and Its Spokesmen: The Making of an Indian, in NEws FROM
INDIAN CouNTRY, Nov. 30, 1995, at 14A, available at 1995 WL 15435599; Johnny
P. Flynn, Ward Churchill Finds a Home with the Friendly United Keetowah
Band, INDIAN CoUNTRY TODAY, Dec. 15, 1994, at A5.
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
was never a part of original Indigenous understanding. Part IV will
consider signs of the future.
I. A SKETCH OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Angela and Boniface Eguzouwa came to America from Nigeria eight years
ago, seeking freedom and opportunity.
The couple had two children after they arrived here in Lancaster County
[Pennsylvania]. They named the girl, who is 8, Fortunate, and the boy, who is
11 months old, Prosper.
Today, Mrs. Eguzouwa became an American citizen, along with 140 other
people from countries ranging from Germany to Vietnam.
"I am happy to be one of you," she said, her face beaming."
"I came here to be free, to be able to do things," Mrs. Eguzouwa, a city
resident said. "In most other countries you have limitations on things you do.
America gives you opportunity ... the good things that everyone wants to
have in life." 18
Whatever their reasons, immigrants have come to the United
States in steady streams throughout the history of the country. Natu-
ralization is the process by which an immigrant becomes a United
States citizen. The concepts of citizenship and naturalization are in-
extricably intertwined. The procedures by which immigrants are nat-
uralized reflect the community's notion of membership.' 9
Naturalization in the United States is a matter of statutory entitle-
ment, conferring on those who satisfy the requirements the full bene-
fits of citizenship. The naturalization process in the United States
embodies the concept of consent, rather than the competing notion of
ascription. While there has been little attention paid to possible justi-
fications of the naturalization process by legal scholars, one scholar
has suggested four normative perspectives on the process. 20
A. The I-istorical Background of Naturalization in the
United States
1. English Roots: The Theory of Natural Allegiance
The concept of American citizenship and the concomitant process
of naturalization derived from English roots.21 The English notion of
the process of naturalization flowed from the common law theory of
18. Cindy Stauffer & Jane Holahan, Seeking Opportunity and Freedom: 140 Take
Oath Here as New Citizens, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Lancaster, Pa), Mar. 26, 1999,
at Al, available at 1999 WL 6468836.
19. See SCHUCx, supra note 8, at 161 (arguing that all of immigration law and policy
can be viewed as an effort to implement one or another vision of citizenship).
20. See infra notes 116-128 and accompanying text.
21. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870,
at 3 (1978). In his book, Kettner provides an excellent discussion of the origins of
American citizenship and the naturalization process.
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natural subjectship, or birthright citizenship. Early English law held
that persons born within the royal dominions were the king's sub-
jects. 2 2 In addition, the statute De natis ultra mare provided that for-
eign-born children of English subjects could inherit in England, thus
giving such children the status of English subject.23 Despite inconsis-
tent interpretation of the statute De natis, English jurists consistently
maintained that either birth or descent could identify the natural-
born subject.24 In modern analytical terms, the system combined the
principles ofjus soli25 and jus sanguinis26 in determining subjectship.
It was not until the early seventeenth century that a theory of alle-
giance and subjectship was fully articulated by Sir Edward Coke, in
Calvin's Case,27 or the Case of the Postnati. The case was a test case
brought primarily to determine the nature of the union that had been
forged between Scotland and England by the accession of James I,
who was already James VI of Scotland.28 The litigation involved dis-
putes over land titles. Two suits were introduced in the name of Rob-
ert Calvin, an infant born in Scotland in 1606, after the accession (a
postnatus). Calvin's counsel argued that their client had been pre-
vented from taking possession of lands to which he was lawfully enti-
tled. Opposing counsel contended that Calvin was an alien and as
such could neither inherit nor sue for lands in England. 29
The opinion of Lord Coke in Calvin's Case emerged as the defini-
tive statement of the law regarding birthright subjectship. Coke be-
gan his analysis by noting that English law encompassed a number of
different kinds of "ligeance" describing various kinds of relation-
ships. 3o Coke's primary concern was with the "ligeantia naturalis"
that characterized the natural-born subject.3 1 Coke broadly defined
this allegiance as the "'true and faithful obedience of the subject due
to his sovereign. This ligeance and obedience is an incident insepara-
ble to every subject: for as soon as he is born, he oweth by birth-right
ligeance and obedience to his sovereign.'" 3 2 Thus, Coke viewed one's
22. Id. at 13. Kettner asserts that the principle was true in practice long before it was
made explicit in 1368. Id.
23. See id. at 14.
24. See id. at 15.
25. Underjus soli, nationality is acquired through mere fact of birth within the terri-
tory of the state. See Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in
Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & Hutm . 73, 77 (1997).
26. Underjus sanguinis, nationality is acquired by descent following the status of at
least one parent, regardless of place of birth. Id.
27. 7 Co. Rep. la (1608) [hereinafter Calvin's Case].
28. See KFTTNER, supra note 21, at 16.
29. See id. (citing Calvin's Case).
30. See id. at 17.
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Calvin's Case, 4b).
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political identity, and hence one's allegiance as a subject to a sover-
eign, as automatically assigned by the circumstances of one's birth.33
According to Coke, the object of the subject's natural allegiance
was the sovereign, who protected a person at the time of his birth.34
This protection, like allegiance, was a natural obligation, owed by the
superior to the inferior and by the sovereign to the subject.35 Coke
conceived of the bond between the subject and the sovereign as involv-
ing reciprocal obligations, "'for as the subject oweth to the king his
true and faithful ligeance and obedience, so the sovereign is to govern
and protect his subjects."' 3 6 Being imposed by the eternal law of na-
ture, which was prior to all man-made law, the bond between subject
and sovereign was perpetual and immutable.
Through his theory, Coke established once and for all the English
preference forjus soli and common membership of Scots and English-
men in one united community of allegiance, regardless of any contrary
indications in any past or future man-made law. But Scots and En-
glishmen were not the only members of the community; aliens born
out of the protection of the English king and owing their natural alle-
giance to another sovereign could become adopted subjects and share
the rights that others enjoyed as their natural inheritance.
By the seventeenth century, English law provided two procedures
for incorporating aliens into the community. 37 Parliamentary acts of
naturalization incorporated foreigners on terms that generally con-
ferred the full rights of subjectship.3 8 The rights and benefits con-
ferred upon aliens through naturalization by parliamentary act had a
large scope because the authority of parliament was itself so broad.
The parliamentary act operated retrospectively to the birth of the
party. It enabled him to inherit land; take lands by descent, purchase,
or devise; and naturalized his alien-born children.3 9 In contrast to the
parliamentary acts, royal patents of denization granted only limited
rights, making the denizen a sort of halfway member who ranked
above the alien, yet below the native-born or naturalized subject.4 0
33. SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 208.
34. KETrNER, supra note 21, at 17.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. (quoting Calvin's Case).
37. See id. at 29.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id. Kettner asserts that the differences between alien and native-born subject
were articulated as disabilities suffered by those who did not enjoy subject status,
the most important being the restriction on real property rights that began to
emerge in the fourteenth century. Non-subjects could acquire and use land, but
they did so only at the sufferance of the king and for the use of the king. An alien
could convey his title in land to another, but it remained subject to royal chal-
lenge, as the alien could not convey better title than the one by which he held. An
alien could not inherit real property or transmit it to his children, even though
[Vol. 80:171
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The limited nature of the rights and benefits conferred upon aliens
through denization resulted from the view that denization was a grant
of royal prerogative or grace. 4 ' Denization did not operate retrospec-
tively;42 the denizen could purchase and own lands, but he could not
inherit them and his children could inherit his land only in limited
circumstances. 43
Through a series of intricate legal cases between 1656 and 1670,
English jurists, starting with Coke's theory of natural allegiance, in-
sisted that the allegiance of the naturalized member must be consid-
ered as perfect and complete as that of the native subject. 44 The
essential purpose of naturalization was, therefore, to make the alien
legally the same as the native Englishman. The alien, through natu-
ralization, was "reborn" as a natural subject. Naturalization con-
ferred upon the alien a fictional status of natural subject.45 Kettner
asserts that while English law envisioned various types of subjectship,
ranging from the natural status of the native-born to the legally ac-
quired status of the naturalized citizen, all varieties of membership
were thought to mirror permanent hierarchical principles of the natu-
ral order.46
2. The Colonial Experience: The Theory of Volitional Allegiance
Emerges
In the colonies, the English theory of naturalization was turned on
its head. That is, the colonists came to see the allegiance of adopted
members as reflecting the character of the naturalization process,
rather than viewing the process as a reflection of the allegiance of the
native-born subject. The colonists perceived the naturalization proce-
dure as a legal one that involved a form of contract between an alien
who chose a new allegiance and a community that consented to adopt
they might be English subjects by virtue of birth within the realm. Because
aliens were denied the right of property in land, it followed that they could not
bring real actions at law, nor could they exercise any franchises or hold offices to
which real property qualifications were attached. See id. at 29-33.
41. See id. at 30.
42. Id. at 32.
43. See id. at 31. If the children had been born abroad, they were aliens and could
not inherit land in England. If specifically included in the denization, they, like
their father, could not inherit but only purchase. If born in England, they were
subjects by birth, personally qualified to take by descent; but, they could inherit
their father's property only if born after his denization. Id.
44. See id. at 36-41 (discussing the legal cases involving the estate of John Ramsey,
earl of Holderness).
45. See id. at 43.
46. Id. at 8.
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him as a subject, and viewed the allegiance that resulted as volitional
and contractual.47
Perhaps the colonial policy on naturalization was dictated by the
practical needs of the emerging country, rather than a concern for doc-
trinal consistency. In order to survive, the new communities needed
to be militarily secure and economically viable. The colonists believed
they needed to have liberal naturalization procedures, and cared little
about how the alien became a member as they knew their own inter-
ests would be served when immigrants were naturalized quickly and
on easy terms. Accordingly, they accepted as fellow members of their
polity persons admitted by a variety of agencies. By whatever means,
the focus was on choice and consent, and naturalization familiarized
for all a volitional relationship between the new member and the
community.48
To both the alien and the native-born settler, the most crucial ben-
efits conferred by naturalization were full rights in real property.4 9
Moreover, since most colonies required land ownership for suffrage,
the conferral of the right to own land to naturalized citizens carried
with it the right to vote.5 0 And while the law in England clearly pro-
hibited it, many colonial governments permitted naturalized subjects
to be elected to local office.5 1
In 1773, English authorities banned local admissions in the colo-
nies. 52 The colonists reacted with anger to the order and a few years
later, in the Declaration of Independence, they included the matter in
their list of grievances against George III: "He has endeavored to pre-
vent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the
Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to en-
courage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Ap-
propriation of Lands."53
47. Id. at 9. The colonists' perception that naturalization was a contractual relation-
ship based on consent and choice had as its origin the influential works of John
Locke and William Blackstone. Kettner further asserts that the colonists took
the model of the naturalized subject as their starting point, and ultimately con-
cluded that all allegiance ought to be considered the result of a contract resting
on consent. Id.
48. See id. at 126-28.
49. Id. at 49.
50. JOHN PALMER GAVIT, AMERICANS BY CHOICE 71 (1922).
51. Kettner asserts that England's fixed policy after 1701 was to exclude naturalized
subjects from high political office. However, an example of a colonial legislative
act permitting naturalized citizens to hold office was Pennsylvania's election law
of 1706 which permitted persons "'naturalized in England or in this province and
territories' to elect and to be elected." KETTNER, supra note 21, at 123 (quoting
PA. STAT., II, 212-221 (1700)).
52. Id. at 105.
53. GAVIT, supra note 50, at 72 (quoting the Declaration of Independence).
[Vol. 80:171
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3. Defining the Qualifications for Naturalization After
Independence
After Independence, the old bonds of personal allegiance that had
once united men in a common subjectship under the British king were
replaced by new contractual terms by which civil and political rights
in the community were to be exchanged for support of republican prin-
ciples, adherence to the Constitution, and responsible and virtuous be-
havior under enlightened forms of self-government.54 Under the
Articles of Confederation, no specific action was taken by Congress to
provide for naturalization.55 There were, however, provisions for an
oath of allegiance for office-holders and offers of land and citizenship
for deserters from the British military ranks.56 After the Revolution, a
number of individual states enacted naturalization statutes that pro-
vided for easy acquisition of citizenship, usually requiring only an
oath of allegiance, without any specific length of residence.57
The need for uniformity was obvious to the framers of the United
States Constitution. As a result, the Constitutional Convention
adopted with little discussion article I, section 8, clause 4, which pro-
vides: "Congress shall have the power... to establish an uniform rule
of naturalization."58 Congress has addressed the question of who
should be offered citizenship in two ways: first, the law addresses
what categories of immigrants should be offered United States citizen-
ship; and second, the law addresses what characteristics and abilities
individuals within those categories should have to be eligible for
naturalization.59
In 1790, Congress passed a law that addressed both the categories
of immigrants eligible for naturalization and the individual qualifica-
tions the eligible immigrant had to possess. Congress extended the
privilege of naturalization to all "free white persons."60 Among whiteimmigrants, individuals had to have resided in the United States for
two or more years and in the state of application for one year.6i Appli-
54. KErrNER, supra note 21, at 247.
55. GAVIT, supra note 50, at 72.
56. Id.
57. Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, New York, South Carolina, and Virginia all
had such statutes; Virginia did require a formal declaration of intention to re-
main in the U.S. and South Carolina required a previous residence of one year.
Id. at 73.
58. See Louis DESII'O & RODOLFO 0. DE LA GARZA, MAKING AMERICANS, REMAKING
Am IRcA 66 (1998).
59. Id.




cants were required to be of "good character," and take an oath or af-
firmation to support the Constitution.6 2
The nineteenth century was characterized by Congress paying lit-
tle attention to the individual qualifications of immigrants seeking
naturalization, while slowly expanding the categories of immigrants
eligible to naturalize. In 1870, Congress extended naturalization eli-
gibility to aliens of African ancestry.63 The legislation was part of the
"radical republican" efforts to legislate equal rights for blacks in one of
the few policy areas controlled exclusively by the federal government.
Congress did not, however, extend eligibility to all nonwhites. In
1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act barred the Chinese from naturaliza-
tion.6 4 Over the next forty years, this prohibition on naturalization
was extended to other Asians, including nationals of India and other
West Asians. 6 5
In the twentieth century Congress expanded the categories of im-
migrants eligible for naturalization and increased the individual qual-
ifications. In 1906, Congress mandated that citizenship applicants
must have speaking knowledge of English, state an intention to reside
permanently in the United States, and provide two "credible" United
States citizen witnesses who would provide affidavits stating that the
naturalization applicant was of good moral character and had resided
in the United States for five years.6 6 In that same legislation Con-
gress also addressed categories of immigrants not eligible for naturali-
zation, excluding anarchist and polygamists. 67
The 1920s may be seen as a period of steady liberalization in natu-
ralization policy. In 1922, Congress allowed women to apply for and
be naturalized on their own, ending the previous practice whereby for-
eign-born women were naturalized only upon marriage to an United
62. Id. A detailed history of how white was white enough and the legal construction
of white privilege may be found in L6PEZ, supra note 16.
63. DESIP1iO & DE LA GARZA, supra note 58, at 69 (citing 16 Statutes at Law 254,
enacted July 14, 1870). This change at first affected few people, as it initially
applied mostly to Afro-Caribbeans who had little incentive to immigrate prior to
1865. It should be noted that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
also proposed and ratified in this era, granted immigrants' children citizenship
based on their birth in the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side." With the Amendment, Congress sought to mandate citizenship and equal
protection of the laws regarding the recently freed slaves.
64. DESIPIO & DE LA GARzA, supra note 58, at 69.
65. Id. (citing Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58).
66. Id. at 70-71.
67. Id. at 71 (citing Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596). The authors
assert that these statutory exclusions signaled a pattern of statutory exclusion of
small categories of immigrants with beliefs or behaviors outside the mainstream
of American society. Id.
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States citizen or upon the naturalization of their husband.68 The 1922
law also provided that female United States citizens no longer lost
their citizenship upon marriage to a foreign male.69 And, citizens of
Indian nations who were not constitutional citizens under the Four-
teenth Amendment because they were not born "subject to the juris-
diction" of the United States were made United States citizens by the
Citizenship Act of 1924.70
After largely ignoring the naturalization laws for two decades,
Congress revisited the area when wartime pressures forced an ac-
knowledgment that the provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act were
incompatible with wartime alliances. Accordingly, in 1943 Congress
repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and added Chinese to the catego-
ries of immigrants eligible to naturalize.71 Congress eliminated the
final national-origin, racial, or ethnic group exclusion in 1952 when it
extended access to naturalization to all Asians and explicitly to all
races.
72
At the same time Congress was generally expanding the categories
of immigrants eligible for United States citizenship, it was adding to
the requirements with which immigrants seeking citizenship had to
comply. In 1950, Congress mandated that naturalization applicants
had to demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamen-
tals of the history and principles of the forms of the American govern-
ment.7 3 In addition, Congress increased the language requirement;
applicants had to read, write, and speak "'words in ordinary usage in
the English language.'"74 The 1950 law also created additional cate-
gorical classes of immigrants ineligible for naturalization based on be-
liefs. Members of Communist organizations and those who advocated
or taught that the United States government should be overthrown
joined the polygamists, anarchists, and draft evaders already ex-
cluded.75 These changes were virtually the last changes to the catego-
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 4, 42 Stat. 1021-22).
70. June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1944)); see Elk
v. Wilkens, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161 (D. Or. 1871)
(No. 8,840). Prior to the Citizenship Act, Indians were extended citizenship in
the United States only in particular statutes or treaties. See DAVID H. GFTCHES
ET AT., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 163-65 (4th ed. 1998).
71. DESIPIO & DE LA GARZA, supra note 58, at 70-71 (citing 57 Stat. 600 (1943)).
72. Id at 71. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat.
163). The current statutory scheme provides: "The right of a person to become a
naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of
race or sex or because such person is married." 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1994).





ries of immigrants eligible to naturalize and individual
qualifications.76
B. Current Naturalization Criteria
Naturalization in the United States is, for the most part, a matter
of statutory entitlement conferring on those who satisfy the require-
ments the full benefits of citizenship.77 Any immigrant who is eigh-
teen years of age or older may apply for naturalization as a United
States citizen. Applicants for naturalization can expect to follow a
regulated process that consists of completing an Application for Natu-
ralization, paying the appropriate fee,78 an interview at the local INS
office, an English and civics test, and an oath of allegiance.79
In order to be eligible for naturalization, immigrants must meet
certain statutory requirements. There are five basic requirements for
naturalization. First, the applicant must be lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence in the United States and be in "continuous resi-
dence" for five years.8 0 Unless the alien can prove otherwise, the
alien's "continuous residence" in the United States is disrupted if the
alien is absent from the United States for more than six months.S1 In
almost every case, an absence of one year or more disrupts an alien's
continuous residence.S2
76. Id.
77. The only exception being only native born citizens are eligible for the Presidency.
See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (stating that except for eligibility to the Presidency,
naturalized citizens can acquire equality with native-born citizens according to
uniform rules prescribed by Congress); see also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163,
165 (1964) (stating that the rights of citizenship of the native born and the natu-
ralized person are of the same dignity and coextensive, except for eligibility to the
Presidency); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (stating that citi-
zenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship, rather
it carries with it all the rights and prerogatives of citizenship obtained by birth,
except for eligibility to the Presidency); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665, 673 (1944) (stating that under the Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands
on equal footing with native citizens in all respects save that of eligibility to the
Presidency).
78. For an application received after January 15, 1999, the fee for filing a naturaliza-
tion application is $225 and the fee for having fingerprints taken is $25, for a
total of $250. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CURRENT NATURALIZATION (1998).
79. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO NATU-
RALIZATION, FORM M-476 (1998) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION].
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1999). The required period is three years if the alien was mar-
ried to a U.S. citizen throughout the period. 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1999).




Second, the applicant must be a person of good moral character.83
When determining whether an applicant is a person of good moral
character, INS will consider several factors. In particular, INS will
consider: the applicant's criminal record, with particular attention
paid to any crime against a person with intent to harm; any crime
against property or the Government that involves "fraud" or evil in-
tent, and commission of two or more crimes for which the aggregate
sentence was five years or more; the violation of controlled substance
laws of the United States, any state or any foreign country; habitual
drunkenness or drunk driving; illegal gambling; prostitution; polyg-
amy; lying to gain immigration benefits; failing to pay court-ordered
child support or alimony payments; confinement in jail, prison, or sim-
ilar institution for which the total confinement was 180 days or more
during the past five years (or three years if the applicant was married
to a United States citizen); the failure to complete any probation, pa-
role, or suspended sentence before the applicant applies for naturali-
zation; terrorist acts; and the applicant's persecution of anyone
because of race, religion, national origin, political opinion, or social
group. 84
Third, an applicant must be able to demonstrate her ability to
speak, read, and write English.85 The applicant's English will be as-
sessed in one of the following ways: (1) in order to test reading ability,
the applicant will be asked to read out loud parts of the Application for
Naturalization form, a set of civics questions, or several simple
sentences; (2) in order to test the writing ability, the applicant will be
asked to write one or two simple sentences; (3) in order to test speak-
ing ability, the applicant will be asked to answer personal questions
and questions about the application during the interview.S6 Excep-
tions to the English requirement are available for certain applicants
based on age or disability.87
Fourth, applicants must be able to demonstrate a knowledge and
understanding of the fundamental history, principles, and form of gov-
ernment of the United States.8 8 During the personal interview, the
applicant will be asked either to verbally answer a set of civics ques-
tions or to take a written multiple-choice test with up to twenty ques-
tions.8 9 As with the English requirement, exceptions to the civics
requirement are available for certain applicants based on age or
disability.90
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1999).
84. A GUIDE TO NATuRALIZATION, supra note 79, at 25.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1) (1999).
86. A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 79, at 37.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1)-(2) (1999).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (1999).
89. A GUIDE To NATURALIZATION, supra note 79, at 37.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(b)(1)(3) (1999).
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Finally, an applicant must show an attachment to principles of the
United States Constitution and that she is well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the United States.9 1 An applicant declares her
"attachment" to the United States and its Constitution when making
the Oath of Allegiance at the naturalization ceremony. 9 2 As stated in
the Oath of Allegiance, the applicant must also renounce all foreign
allegiances to become a United States citizen. In addition, as stated in
the Oath, the applicant must be willing to support and defend the
principles of the United States Constitution and the laws of the
United States. This means that, when required by law, the applicant
must be willing to (1) fight in the U.S. Armed Forces; (2) perform non-
combatant service in the U.S. Armed Forces; and (3) perform civilian
service for the U.S.93
C. Values and Justifications of the Naturalization Process
1. The Concepts of Ascription and Consent
The naturalization process embodies different values as it existed
in the common law and as it exists in the United States. The differ-
ence is best explained by the competing principles of ascription and
consent. 94
Generally, and in its purest form, the principle of ascription holds
that one's political membership is entirely and irrevocably determined
by some objective circumstance-in this context, birth within a partic-
ular sovereign's allegiance or territory.95 According to this principle,
individual preference does not affect political membership; only the
natural, immutable circumstances of one's birth are considered rele-
vant. Sir Edward Coke's theory of natural allegiance embodied the
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1999).
92. The Oath of Allegiance is: "I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and en-
tirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or
citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that I will perform noncombatant service in the
Armed Forces of the United States when required by law; that I will perform
work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law;
and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; so help me God." A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, supra note 79, at 28.
93. Id. The INS may exempt an applicant from these requirements if she, because of
religious teachings and beliefs, is against fighting or serving in the military and
the applicant follows the appropriate procedure.
94. ScHUmC, supra note 8, at 207. Brubaker uses the terms "attribution" and "acqui-
sition," respectively, to denote the principles of ascription and consent. See Wil-
liam Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Naturalization: Policies and Politics, in
IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EURoPE AND NORTH AMERICA
99, 101-15 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
95. See SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 207.
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ascriptive view of membership. English jurists viewed the naturaliza-
tion process in their country as reflecting Coke's ascriptive frame-
work. That is, they viewed the naturalization process as conferring a
"fictional" ascriptive status upon the alien.96
The principle of consent, on the other hand, holds that political
membership can result only from free individual choices. According to
this principle, the circumstances of one's origins may influence one's
preferences for political affiliation, but they are not determinative.9 7
The consent theory emerged from challenges made by seventeenth
and eighteenth century Enlightenment theorists against the feudal
social institutions.9 S The most influential exposition of the theory was
John Locke's Second Treatise of Government.9 9 Locke based the the-
ory on the consent of free individuals to enter into society and estab-
lish government to preserve their natural rights.iOO According to
Locke, individuals are not naturally subject to a sovereign. The state
of nature is a "State of perfect Freedom, where each individual is free
to act as he thinks fit, without depending on the will of others or any
Subordination or Subjection."loi However, in a state of nature, an in-
dividual often lacks the power to defend herself, rendering her "very
insecure" in the enjoyment of her rights.102
Individuals thus voluntarily form a compact, a community "for the
mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates."103 Under
the terms of the consensual compact, each individual foregoes her nat-
ural freedom of action "to be regulated by the Laws made by Soci-
ety."' 0 4 In turn, the individual "engages [her] natural force . . . to
assist the Executive Power of the Society, as the law thereof shall re-
quire," and receives "protection from [society's] whole strength."10 5
The community, therefore, as the body that protects the individual's
rights and receives her allegiance, is the political sovereign. Thus, al-
though Locke agreed with Coke that the subject owed allegiance to the
sovereign who embodied and controlled the legal means of protection,
Locke insisted that the community, not the king, was the ultimate
96. See id. at 208.
97. See id. at 207.
98. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution,
and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IaIZGR.
L.J. 667, 673 (1995).
99. See id. (citing JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press. 1988) (3d ed. 1698)).








sovereign. The resulting allegiance was not the product of nature, but
rather arose from the original compact.io6
Jonathan Drimmer asserts that by the eighteenth century, courts
had unequivocally embraced Coke's jus soli view of birthright citizen-
ship and continued to apply the principles enunciated in Calvin's
Case, while legal theorists accepted the Lockean view of the nature of
the community.1 0 7 It was, according to Drimmer, William Black-
stone's Commentaries on the Law of England that synthesized these
divergent legal and philosophical views.10 8
Blackstone argued that it is "a maxim in the law, that protection
and subjection are reciprocal" and arise from an individual's birth
within the dominion of the crown.10 9 However, following Locke, he
analyzed the "mutual bond" between subject and sovereign in terms of
"the original contract of society."11O Blackstone, like Locke, stated
that individuals formed a society for mutual protection, and argued
that:
[Tihe whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedi-
ence to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should
guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this pro-
tection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community without
which submission of all it was impossible that protection should be certainly
extended to any.1 1 1
Thus, Blackstone proposed that communal association itself consti-
tuted the sovereign, and the individual owed allegiance to "the com-
munity" in exchange for its protection. i1 2
As Drimmer asserts, the colonists viewed their independent poli-
ties as "Lockean associations formed by communal consent for the mu-
tual preservation of fundamental individual rights."1i 3 In this
context, the colonists viewed the legal process of naturalization as a
form of contract between an alien who chose a new allegiance and a
community that consented to adopt him as subject.1 ' 4
2. Normative Justifications of the Naturalization Process
It is clear that the naturalization process is the means by which
immigrants are made United States citizens. A necessary inquiry,
106. See id. at 675.
107. See id.
108. See id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND
357 (1979)). Drimmer asserts that Blackstone was generally recognized as the
authoritative source of the common law by the American colonists. Id.
109. Id. at 675-76.
110. Id. at 676.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 677-78.
114. See KETTNER, supra note 21, at 9.
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however, is the justification or purpose of United States naturaliza-
tion policies. Although legal scholarship is thin on this topic,115 Ger-
ald Neuman has set forth four normative justifications of the
naturalization process: unilateral liberal, bilateral liberal, thin repub-
lican, and thick communitarian. 1i6
In a liberal model, the individual's desire for naturalization is
broadly motivated by the desire to achieve the benefits and protec-
tions that come along with citizenship. The motivating benefits may
include rights of political participation, but in an extreme liberal vi-
sion, the individual would view political participation instrumentally
as a means of safeguarding or advancing his private interests. 1 7 The
model of "unilateral liberalism" would recognize that society's motiva-
tion for admitting individuals to citizenship is the need to disseminate
its citizenship broadly to ensure that the protections of citizenship are
available to all residents who desire them and who are willing to un-
dertake the concomitant obligations. According to this model, natu-
ralization would be considered prima facie as a right for those who
satisfy certain objective criteria of need, and who desire it, although
the right could be denied to those who present serious dangers to the
society.ii 8
The model of "bilateral liberalism" would recognize that the soci-
ety's consent to membership is as necessary as the individual's con-
sent. The society's motivation to consent would be based on a "Wide-
ranging instrumental calculation of net benefits it would gain from
acquiring the applicant as a member."11 9 The political participation of
the individual would be a factual input into these calculations, but it
would not be afforded greater weight than the competitive advantages
in the fields of trade, technology, military service, or sports.J20
The "thin republican" model "places primary emphasis on political
participation as the purpose of citizenship and views political partici-
pation as committed engagement in the life of the polity rather than
as self-interested protection of private interest."12l According to this
perspective, the "individual seeks naturalization in order to enjoy the
115. The focus of most legal scholarship on naturalization has been on the constitu-
tionality of naturalization criteria and the question of whether congressional
power over naturalization is "plenary." For discussions of that issue, see gener-
ally Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GEo. L.J. 1007
(1976); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE
L.J. 769, 796-98 (1971); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Con-
gress to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50 IOWA L. Rav. 1093 (1965).
116. See Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. IN'L L.
237 (1994).
117. Id. at 238-39.
118. Id. at 239.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 239-40.
121. Id. at 240.
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good of republican citizenship in that polity; the polity seeks to natu-
ralize those resident aliens who apply for the proper reasons, and who
demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of living up to the requirements of
republican citizenship in that polity."1 2 2
The "thick communitarian" model views citizenship as a reflection,
and not a definition, of the identity of the community and its mem-
bers.i 2 3 Thus, according to this perspective, the "individual seeks to
naturalize at some stage in her assimilation to the group identity, to
confirm that she is becoming a true member of the community and to
attach the appropriate legal consequences to that fact."124 Likewise,
the "community offers naturalization to those individuals who meet
its criteria of identity or are making satisfactory progress toward that
goal."12 5
Neuman argues that the thin republican model of naturalization
fits the current United States naturalization criteria. The naturaliza-
tion criteria emphasize the public, rather than the private, aspect of
citizenship.126 The ideological qualifications for naturalization are de-
fensible, for example, from the republican perspective. Under the re-
publican model, the purpose of naturalization is to admit the
applicant to the political project of republican self-government, and
therefore the applicant's acceptance of the republican framework is a
central qualification for admittance. i 27 Further, the criteria aims at a
civically virtuous citizenry. The English language requirement,
Neuman argues, is also defensible from the thin republican perspec-
tive. He argues that the language requirement can be understood as
an educational qualification rather than a linguistic qualification in
the sense that, like the civics requirement, it requires applicants to
invest time and effort in acquiring knowledge as a prerequisite for
naturalization. 28  From the thin republican perspective, then, the
prospective citizens investment in acquiring knowledge that will im-
122. Id. at 240-41. Neuman asserts that the "thinness" of this model lies in its rather
abstract emphasis on political socialization as the polity does not reject the par-
ticipation of individuals who have not adopted a fuller set of dominant culture
values. Id. at 241.
123. Id. at 241.
124. Id.
125. Id. Neuman asserts that this model is "thick" because it treats some degree of
assimilation to dominant cultural values or practices as a prerequisite to natural-
ization, on grounds of community identity. While a liberal society might regard
all its residents as necessarily members, it would not be thick in this sense. Id.
126. See id. at 278.
127. See id. at 260-61.
128. See id. at 266. Neuman asserts that the existence of exceptions for categories of
persons who are considered unable to acquire a new language underscores the
proposition that the criterion sets forth a task for the applicant rather than a test
of an inherent characteristic of the applicant. Id.
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prove their political participation represents the exercise of at least a
thin civic virtue.
Whether unilateral or bilateral, thin or thick, all of Neuman's mod-
els reflect an Anglo-European perspective which is not the only rele-
vant point of view. Section II presents two additional accounts of
naturalization from the perspectives of two Indigenous nations. These
accounts represent the understandings of those traditions.
II. INDIGENOUS NATURALIZATION
A. Tribal Sovereignty and "Membership Selection": Blood
Quantum as Fiction Among the Sovereign Umonho n
Nation
1. Origins and Treaties
The Maha, or Umoho (Omaha) Nation, an Indigenous people of
what has become known as the Americas, along with the Osage, Qua-
paw, Kansa (Kaw), and Poca, were once part of a much larger body
politic called the Great onga (leader) Ni kashinga (people) Wi n
(one), or "One Leader People." At one time the Honga Ni kashPga
Wi n must have numbered in the hundreds of thousands.
For reasons unknown, the Honga Ni kashinga Wi n (often errone-
ously called "the Osage" in Indo-European/American, or IEA litera-
ture) broke up into smaller groups and left the region by waterways,
moving in a westwardly direction. After they crossed what is now
called the Mississippi River and began to travel up what has become
known as the mighty Missouri River, the Quapaw and Osage re-
mained behind and went their separate ways. Later the Kansa left
the Hu'thuga (tribal circle), settling in present-day Kansas. The
Ponca and Maha were the last to separate, the Maha being the last
to pitch their tents in the Hu'thuga. To this day the Umonho n hold
in their possession many sacred relics that date back beyond anyone's
memory.
It has been said that the French may have been the first Indo-Eu-
ropean people to have met what were to be known as the Maha by the
1630s; mathe (winter) gthebon (ten) no'ba (two) or (twenty), or (20
winter) later, such contact was documented on a map made by the
French. By that time the Maha were established along portions of the
mid-Missouri River basin.
One and a half centuries later, through presentation of a medal of
friendship and an accompanying document, the Spanish were the first
Indo-European sovereign to establish formal ties with the Maha in
1796. At this time the Maha were overseen by a "non-traditional"
chieftain, Wajiga-sabe (Blackbird), who by all accounts-both wa'xe
(non-Native) and Maha-was an autocratic leader, and thus, not in
keeping with the more ancestral ways of decision-making and govern-
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ance known and practiced among the Maha Ni kashinga ("Umonhon"
People). It can now be claimed by the Umo'hon that the 1800 epi-
demic of di'xe (smallpox) that killed Wajinga-sabe and decimated
much of the Nation was ironically a means through which Ni kash-
inga returned, however briefly, to a more ancestral way of decision-
making and governance.
Through a series of Treaties authorized under its Constitution, the
U.S. Government, at its insistence, entered into a formal relationship
with the Maha as early as July 18, 1815, when the Maha, under Arti-
cle 3 of what was to be called the "Portage Des Sioux" Treaty, did so
"hereby acknowledge themselves and their tribe or nation to be under
the protection of the United States, and of no other nation, power, or
sovereign whatever."
The Maha may or may not have understood the "full meaning" of
what was being said here, but even if they did not, the impetus for this
and all subsequent Treaties was totally at the behest of the United
States, who were, according to the preamble of the Portage Des Sioux
Treaty, "desirous of reestablishing peace and friendship" between the
two parties "on the same footing upon which they stood before the late
war between the United States and Great Britain."
The motivation of the Maha in entering the Treaty process with
the United States even as early as 1815 was most likely simple sur-
vival. Even in translation the meaning of the Treaties from the begin-
ning must have been clear to them. Perhaps at this time the outlines
of subsequent agreements were not, but the language used in each
Treaty was "offered" by the Americans, and is not of Maha construc-
tion. Thus, careful readings of the Treaties reveal (in English) a tone
of humiliation for the Maha that must have been very hard for them
to take. Take for example, Articles 1 and 2 of the "Fort Atkinson"
Treaty (October 6, 1825):
.. admitt[ancel by the Maha tribe of Indians, that they reside within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States, acknowledge their supremacy, and claim
protection. That said tribe also admit the right of the United States to regu-
late all trade and intercourse with them.
from Article 1
The United States agree to receive the Maha tribe of Indians into their friend-
ship and under their protection, and to extend to them, from time to time,
such benefits and acts of kindness as may be convenient, and seem just and
proper to the President of the United States.
from Article 2
Subsequent Treaties entered into, again at the continuing insis-
tence of the U.S. Government, with the (this term imposed) "domestic
dependent nation" of the Maha or Umonhon-including those of the
"Platte Purchase" of October 15, 1836; the "Treaty with the Omaha" of
March 16, 1854; and the "Treaty with the Omaha" of March 6, 1865-
"reaffirmed" this relationship between the "two sovereigns" as estab-
lished by Article 3 of the Portage Des Sioux Treaty (1815).
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In the Prairie Du Chien Treaty of 1830, the Umonho', Santee,
Yankton, Iowa, Oto-Missouri and Ponca urged the United States to
establish a separate reservation for the mixed blood Natives belonging
to the foregoing nations. It was thought that these mixed bloods
should be together since they were progressing toward assimilation at
a more rapid pace. Such a reservation was established and the land
allotted to the mixed bloods. However, it was eventually sold and the
mixed bloods returned to their respective reservations to be close to
their kinship.
Eventually the Umonhon ceded as much as 11,000,000 acres of
land prior to the Treaty of 1854 which established the Reservation,
but even then the American Government would not leave them alone.
Mathe gthebon (ten Winter) later in the Treaty of 1865, one-third of
the Reservation itself was sold as a new home for Ho-Chuck (Winne-
bago), and in subsequent mathe the remaining land base was "le-
gally" parceled out through the Omaha Allotment Act of 1882 in tribal
allotments (agreed to by the Umohon only out of concern that they
would be moved south to "Indian Territory," as the Ponca in 1878 had
been forced to move), with an additional 50,000 acres of unallotted
land later offered for sale by the Federal Government, and thrown
open to the Indo-EuropeanlAmericans as "surplus land."
Yet in no other provision of any Treaty entered into between these
two sovereigns between 1815 to 1865, do either sovereign relinquish
any further rights of their sovereignty to subordinate territories or
states whatsoever, including self-governance, but held inviolate their
relationship as sovereigns, including the right of either sovereign to
construe its membership subject to its own social, economic, political,
legal, cultural, and spiritual practices.
Such rights include certain traditions and practices whose origins,
nurturance, exercise and teaching remain distinctly their own, as it is
with the expressed ways of the Umoho with respect to the Four
Hills Of Life-infancy, youth, adulthood and elder. These particular
Umonhon ways encompass child-rearing practices (including use of
the cradleboard); the assumption of responsibilities by the individual,
both for themselves and the Hlu'thuga, as an expression of the mani-
festation of clanship through the cohesiveness of the family kinship
organizational structure; the use of the iye (speech) as an expression
of religious supplication of Wakonda (the Great Unseen Power); and
observance of certain ceremonial rites, including those embracing
each passage through the Four Hills of Life, a spiritual expression of
the Umohon belief in the interrelationship and sacredness of life.
Here remains the essence, the kernel of intent for what it means to
be Umonhon , even in our own time. Briefly spoken, the Umonhon con-
tinue to believe in the indestructibility of matter being transformed
through the dispensation of energy into new forms of matter and life,
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a view shared by much of Western science today, but whose origin in
Umoho cosmology is much more old. Mathe gthebon hi" wi n
gthebon nonba (130 winter) ago the Washis'ka (shell) Athin (they
have) (together-"those who have the shell") were still known to prac-
tice changeling, transforming from human to animal form and back,
while other ancient Umonhon societies were known through oral tra-
dition to have transformed weather. With such a modern and ances-
tral history, the powers and forces of nature remain for the Umo'hon
part of the totality of their daily experience.
The wa'xe attempted to take away the vestiges of what it was to be
Native, what it was to be Umohon, by discouraging tribal dress and
the speaking of Umbonhon iye (Omaha speech, or language), and of-
fering wa'xe clothing and English. The disruption of the extended
family unit through the imposition of boarding schools and the prohi-
bition of ancestral spiritual practice while exalting the virtues of
Christianity completed these efforts.
2. Adoption as a Kinship Practice
As far back as historic times, the Umonho" have used adoption as
a kinship practice. This goes back to the Umonho' in relation with
other nations, with whom it has friendly relations. Later when
Umonho n shinga zhina (children, youth) were sent off to boarding
schools some of them married (e.g. Seneca, Chippewa, Bannock,
Osage, Ponca, Pawnee, Ho-Chunk, Oto-Missouria, Iowa, Yank-
ton, Oglala (Lakota) Sioux, as well as a mixture of mainly French
extractions).
Adoption was usually done on a personal basis; that is, an
Umonhon man would adopt another person as a brother, father,
grandfather, or uncle. A woman would adopt a mother, aunt, sister or
grandmother. Or they would go outside the Hu'thuga and adopt
someone from another nation. People outside the Umonho' who mar-
ried into Hu'thuga and followed the customs and traditions were
more readily accepted as Utmonho n then the ones who made no effort
to learn the ways.
It was regarded a high honor for someone in good standing to adopt
one as a relative. Anyone who came among the Umonhon for a good
reason was honored by an adoption ceremony and these, too, were not
taken lightly. Many Umonhon were part Po'ca and over the years
took adoption seriously. One not only became the best of friends, but
also had an obligation to treat the adoptive person as one's own blood
relative. Once adoption by ceremony was solemnized, the relationship
became as kin and respected. Adopted persons always remembered
special events and gave gifts to each other.
The Umo"hon never adopted anyone in the name of the Umonho
n
Ni kashinga. It was always done on a personal basis.
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Onpa Tonga (Big Elk) adopted Joseph LaFleshe, part French, as
his son and left the chieftainship to LaFlesche when he died near
Omaha in 1844. LaFlesche went on to become principal chief of the
Umonhon , the last chief under the traditional rule. The principal
chief, Onpa Tonga, adopted Joshua Pilcher's only mixed blood son,
John, as his own son. John married into the Omaha Tribe and cast his
lot with the Omahas.
When the Umonhon in 1882 first received allotments of land in
severalty, several allottees were non-Umo'ho", but had lived with
them long enough to be counted as tribal members through adoption.
3. Blood and Proportionality
Proportionality is a concept of total artificiality in political affairs
and came into vogue during the "Great Compromise" of the Constitu-
tional Convention held in secret at Independence Hall, Philadelphia in
the hot summer of 1787. It was at this juncture of impasse between
the agriculturally-oriented slavetrading South and the tepid industri-
alism of string-settlements North that representation within the Fed-
eral House of Representatives would be premised, in part, on
"excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons" and en-
coded in the Constitution.
Following this early pattern, with the creation of the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs in 1824, it became customary and later established by the
Federal Department of the Interior that anyone claiming to be an In-
digenous person, in order to qualify as eligible for government bene-
fits, was required to possess at least one-fourth degree (any mixture if
"Indian") Aboriginal blood.
Under the paradigms of this law the "Indian" nations who accepted
the "Indian Reorganization Act" (Howard/Wheeler Act) of 1934 for
convenience sake used the same formula of one-fourth Native blood for
tribal enrollment. In order for the Secretary of the Interior to approve
the enrollment of the Umonho Nation, the Umonho had to follow
the blood quantum laid out by the Secretary.
In 1961, the Umonhon won two judgment awards from the United
States Government for lost lands taken from the Umonhon Nation in
a series of Treaties made during the 1800s. Using the two allotments
of 1882 and the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 as baseline documents to
determine degree of Indigenous Umonhon blood, in addition to the ten
clan (five earth and five sky) divisions of the Umonhon Hu'thuga, the
Umonhon were able to register, through an enrollment process in
1961, all who then qualified for tribal membership. In short, one had
to trace ancestry back to an original allottee.
At that time, several original allottees were living, some born in




In the second judgment award in 1962, the sovereign Umonhon
Nation changed its rules on membership to one-half Umonho' blood
quantum on the father's side, but the Secretary of the Interior would
not sign the document, and the Umonhon had to return to an enroll-
ment criteria of one-fourth Umonhon blood from either mother or fa-
ther. This brought in more enrolled members, and really was a
disadvantage to the U.S. Government in its overall plan to eventually
terminate Federal service to an Aboriginal Nation, Indian tribe or
band. Yet there were several Natives who had applied for member-
ship but did not qualify for enrollment. Although they were almost
full-blooded, they did not have enough of one particular Indian tribe or
Indigenous Nation. Today they hold no tribal affiliation with any
tribe or nation that still uses the one-fourth Indian blood rule estab-
lished by the BIA to qualify for Federal benefits. Many Indian chil-
dren whose parents met and married at off-reservation inter-tribal
boarding schools got left out of tribal per capita payments and even
membership in a tribe due to being ineligible for enrollment.
Most Indian tribes and Aboriginal Nations have their own enroll-
ment criteria for membership, but it used to be that the Umoho'
were the only sovereign having a blood roll.
4. Conclusion
The United States Government disrupted Indigenous cultures,
"Rounding up the Injuns" in the 1800s and placing them on Reserva-
tions-in effect treating them as prisoners. This cruel and unusual
punishment took away from them their food source, their lifestyles,
religion, social life, and in its place subjected them to numerous dis-
eases and mentallemotional anguishes. Mathegthebo' cat ° (50
winter) or more of deteriorating physical health and grievous psycho-
logical injuries have created a populace overwhelmed with poverty,
low self esteem, and depression that has resulted in escalating domes-
tic violence and crime among juveniles.
The Umonhon wonder why it must be that all Aboriginal Nations,
Indian tribes, bands and groups share poverty and severe health
problems. When an entire race of people living scattered in a land of
plenty share low living standards, something major is wrong and must
be corrected. The United States Government has kept Native people
locked into a system that prevents them from exercising their sover-
eign rights in becoming self-sufficient.
The Maha believe that pursuant to the treaties it relinquished
only its lands but none of its sovereignty and established a trust rela-
tionship with the government. The Maha believe that any action
taken by Congress should have its consent before becoming law. Its
right of sovereignty should always be protected, although it may not
be in the best interest of outsiders.
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The Maha believe they have respected the provisions of the trea-
ties in good faith, but that the government through Congress and the
federal courts continue to erode and violate the treaties due to pres-
sure from the States and special interest groups.
In controlling a subjected but undefeated people, greed of any na-
ture perpetuates disrespect and disregard for land, water, air, re-
sources and well being of a society's citizens. The United States as a
government is motivated by personal, corporate and political greed
and lacks the morals, values, or spiritual insights required to develop
a productive, peaceful society, where everyone respects the other and
where money does not separate the people into classes.
Since the wa'xe came upon these shores nothing has gone right.
B. Winnebago Naturalization
The term naturalization to the Winnebago people means adoption
of another people into their own. This meaning is centuries old. Most
of the adoption was along clan lines. There are twelve clans among
the Winnebago people, arranged into two divisions; the air family, and
the earth family. The air family consists of the Thunder, Eagle,
Hawk, and Pigeon. The Bear, Buffalo, Water Spirit, Wolf, Deer, Elk,
Snake, and Fish make up the earth family.
Each clan had its own chiefs. Before contact with the Europeans,
the Winnebago tribe was very large, consisting of 35,000 people. In
those days each clan was subdivided into four. For example, the Bear
Clan would have the Black Bear, Brown Bear, Grizzly Bear, and Black
Bear with White Nose. Another example would be the White Headed
Eagle, Brown Eagle, Black Eagle, and White Eagle.
The four sub-chiefs of a clan then appointed a head chief of that
clan to participate in the Grand National Council which was composed
of all twelve clans. The other thirty-six sub-chiefs sat in the smaller
village council and heard matters concerning adoption, blood feuds,
marriage, divorce, and other matters dealing with people in the com-
munity or village level. The Grand National Council only dealt with
matters such as warfare, treaties with other nations, land issues,
water issues, clan disputes, murder, and any other matters that con-
cerned all the people on the national level. A Council usually preceded
an important undertaking. The members of the Council did not vote
on issues, but those present always presented their opinions in
speeches. The smaller village council only appeared before the Grand
National Council when their discussion on smaller issues became
dead-locked and only the Grand National Council had the authority to
deal with the issue. Their final say was law.
As a rule, the appointed head chief led the discussion. Sometimes
they sat all night deliberating on some important matter, continuing
for several nights until they decided the outcome of the case. The peo-
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ple as a mass had very little influence on the council, and they never
appeared before it until they were summoned, as the people had no
voice in electing chiefs because these were hereditary positions. If a
chief at his death had no heir, he appointed some other qualified mem-
ber of his clan to succeed him as chief.
There were two types of adoption or naturalization into the Winne-
bago tribe. One was on the national level and one was on the clan or
sub-clan level. Naturalization of a person of another people into the
Winnebago tribe was a very serious matter. The earliest record deal-
ing with naturalization on the national level comes from oral tradi-
tion. When the Winnebago people met the upper Mississippian people
on the Rock River eleven hundred years ago they were enemies. After
a series of battles they decided to call a truce and become allies. They
did this by intermarrying with each other. The Grand National Coun-
cil then made the marriage partner of a Winnebago male member a
Winnebago, but in name only. They could never belong to one of the
twelve clans and their sub-gens. But all offspring of the mating would
become clan members of their fathers. A Winnebago woman marrying
a Mississippian man would become a Mississippian member and her
offspring would be members of his father's clan.
Before the Winnebagos became depopulated in 1640, naturaliza-
tion or adoption into a clan or sub-clan was very common. This was
different than when the Grand National Council adopted a large
group of people into the tribe. At the clan level an adopted person
could become a member of the clan. On the other hand, members of
another Tribe adopted by the Grand National Council could never be-
come clan members, only Winnebago in name. Of course, at the clan
level there were certain requirements and tests that had to be met
before a person could become a clan member. If a war-party brought
back women and children from a raid, they were first taken to the
lodge of the Hawk Clan Chief. He and his three sub-chiefs would then
decide what to do with the prisoners.
The three sub-chiefs then sent word out through the village and
surrounding villages that they had some prisoners who could be
adopted if any family had lost members due to disease or battle and
wanted them to take the place of their own dead. These tribal mem-
bers would then come and tell the chief and his aids why they wanted
the prisoners. The family who got one or two of the prisoners would
then take them back to their own lodge and inform the sub-chief of
their clan that they were going to have adoption ceremonies.
The medicine man of the sub-clan would perform the appropriate
ceremonies and the prisoner would become a member of that house-
hold, but not a clan member. That would have to wait for a year. In
the meantime the adopted member would learn the language, cus-
toms, and culture of his/her adopted people. If a male prisoner was
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adopted and not killed, he would become a servant to his future wife
for one year.
After learning what was required of them, the adopted prisoners
would then go through clan ceremonies and become members of that
family and clan, but they could never carry a clan name. Only clan
members born into a clan could do so. Adopted, naturalized persons
were now Winnebagos and had to obey the laws and customs of their
new people.
After 1640, when the Winnebagos became depopulated because of
disease and warfare, adoption ceremonies began to involve white
Europeans. In 1670, the Grand National Council adopted the French
trader, Nicolas Perrot, to be a member of the tribe. The family that
wanted to adopt him was none other than Chief Thunder's own Thun-
der Clan. Nicolas Perrot received a Winnebago name and he learned
the language and customs of his adopted people. His naturalization as
a member of the Winnebago tribe was complete.
Because of the depopulation of the tribe, the original arrangements
of the smaller village councils had ceased to exist. Only the larger
Grand National Council functioned in its traditional manner, and they
now began to hear village matters at council meetings. In 1729, Chief
Hopoe-Kaw married Sabrevoir DeKarry, a French man. According to
clan law he could have become a co-ruler or even chief of the tribe if he
had wanted. He had learned the language and customs of his wife's
people and he received a Winnebago name. But he knew that if he
went through ceremonies he could never leave his wife's people. So he
chose not to be adopted through ceremonies. He left the Chief in 1736,
and moved back to Quebec, Canada.
Other French and Scots-Irish men were adopted into the tribe as
the years passed. Many of these men became war-leaders because
they had the culture and knowledge of two peoples. Other Indian peo-
ple were still being adopted into the tribe up to the reservation period.
They could now participate in clan ceremonies and dances. Many
Lakota became inter-mixed with Winnebago people as would the
Omaha later in the 1900s.
Then federal Indian law stepped in and said, "only we have the
authority to decide who's Winnebago or not." As years went by, they
returned this authority to the tribe, but by that time the Winnebagos
had become acculturated. As a result, the Winnebago took for their
own the federal rule of quarter-blood. One-quarter of Winnebago
blood allowed enrollment. There were no longer tests or ceremonies of
asking or promising. To be a Winnebago became a matter of a pedi-
gree in a strange world.
A return to the old ways of adoption and naturalization would re-
quire that the Winnebago change the Constitution and code provisions
currently in place. A choice in the matter is for the Winnebago people
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and should not be controlled by federal interests. Skin color, race, and
blood were not issues in the way of the Winnebago, but were forced
upon them by the federal government. Nevertheless, blood and race
are commonly used in Indian country all across the United States.
What does it mean to be a Winnebago and why would the federal
government look to blood? Is it to limit the obligations of the govern-
ment to the Winnebago? These obligations result in promises and
some provision of health care, dental care, education, and trust land.
Would a person seeking only these understand the Winnebago? The
obligations also include a promise to protect Winnebago sovereignty.
Is a racial difference required to command respect as a sovereign or
does a racial criteria prohibit that respect? It is the Winnebago that
now must look to the past and the future. We are a people, human
beings, not a breed.
III. VAMPIRE LAW
The history of the "Indians" begins with the arrival of this person Columbus,
but the history of the People goes back to the beginning of time. This predator,
civilization, confuses us about our identity.1 2 9
John Trudell
A. The Origins of Federal Blood Law
The issue to be considered is whether or not the United States
would recognize a person, without some Indian blood or descent, who
is an adopted or naturalizedi 30 member of an Indian nation as a mem-
ber of that nation for purposes of federal laws distributing sovereign
authority, jurisdiction. The foundational case is United States v.
Rogers.1 3 1
William S. Rogers was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Arkansas which geographically included at
that time the Cherokee Nation. The charge was the murder of Jacob
Nicholson. Both Rogers and Nicholson, white men and onetime citi-
zens of the United States, had long before the acts in question become
129. Trudell, supra note 1, at 2.
130. Grandchildren of one of the authors were born in Korea. They became kin/family
when first held in the arms of the author's daughter and son-in-law. They were
legally adopted under the laws of the State of Nebraska and thereafter natural-
ized under the laws of the United States. Indian nations prior to European con-
tact did not generally make the distinction between the people and the state
which is now fundamental to western thought. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UN-
GER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY 58-61 (1976). Consequently, what many would call
naturalization Indian people often call adoption. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, A LAw
OF BLOOD, 191-200 (1970); Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous
Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 297 (1993) ("What makes a
political system 'tribal?' By definition, it is one that is based on kinship.").
131. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
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by marriage adopted members of the Cherokee and entitled to all
rights and privileges under the nation's laws. Both were domiciled in
Indian country where the acts took place.1 32
Federal authority came under the act of Congress on the 30th of
June, 1834, entitled, "An act to regulate trade and intercourse with
the Indian tribes, and to preserve the peace of the frontiers. 133 A
provision to the twenty-fifth section of the act stated that the section
"shall not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the per-
son or property of another Indian."134 Rogers put in a plea to the in-
dictment arguing against jurisdiction and the Circuit Court, being
divided, certified the record to the Supreme Court.
Were Rogers and Nicholson Indians? Chief Justice Taney au-
thored the opinion of the Court: "Whatever obligations the prisoner
may have taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption,
his responsibility to the laws of the United States remained un-
changed and undiminished. He was still a white man, of the white
race, and therefore not within the exception in the act of Congress." 13 5
Every lawyer knows that law is, as is the world, a mixture of idea
and fact. Some legal concepts, "Indian" (perhaps), seem to denote an
existential reality and connote legal relations. Other legal concepts,
"Indian" (perhaps), seem to denote jural rights, duties, powers, or lia-
bilities, while carrying a connotation of the usual factual circum-
stances. 136 Legal thought understands, as did Chief Justice Taney,
that the question is never, "Is Joshua an Indian?" Rather the proper
question is, "Whether or not Joshua is an Indian for the purpose of a
principle, rule, goal, or policy recognized by the law." The law reflects
both purposive ordering and the reality of existing chaos. What pur-
posive vision appears in the Taney opinion? And what values inform
that purpose?
The circuit court had certified three questions to the Court. First,
could a citizen of the United States expatriate himself without some
kind of form or condition imposed by the federal government? Second,
could the Cherokee Nation or other Indian nations exercise the sover-
eign power to naturalize citizens of other nations and to make them
exclusively citizens of the Indian nation? Third, does the provision
apply only to "natives of the Indian tribes of full blood or also to Indi-
ans (natives), or others adopted by, and permanently resident within,
132. Id. at 567-71.
133. Id. at 572.
134. Id. The statutory authority originated in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.
The current statue is the Indian Country Crimes Act or, as it is also known, the
Federal Enclave Statute, or Interracial Crime Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
The actual statute at issue here was 4 Stat. 733 (1834).
135. Id. at 573.
136. See JOHN C.H. Wu, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JURISPRUDENCE 554 (1958).
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the Indian tribes" or also to "progeny of Indians by whites or by ne-
groes, or of whites or negroes by Indians, born or permanently resi-
dent within the Indian tribes and limits," or also to "Whites or free
negroes born and permanently resident in the tribes, or to negroes
owned as slaves, and resident within the Indian tribes, whether pro-
cured by purchase, or there born the property of Indians?"' 3 7
Chief Justice Taney began by stating that "native tribes" had never
been treated as independent nations.1 38 Following the lead of Chief
Justice Marshall, he noted the uselessness of raising any questions of
justice, and at any rate:
[F]rom the very moment the general government came into existence to this
time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit of hu-
manity and justice, and has endeavored by every means in its power to en-
lighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save them if possible
from the consequences of their own vices. 1 3 9
He next asserted the power of Congress to make law for Cherokee
country that would be applicable to any person, and then turned to the
provision in question finding it clear that a white man adopted at ma-
ture age did not come within the Indian against Indian crime excep-
tion. The Chief Justice said that such a person may by adoption
become a member of the Cherokee subject to their laws and usage, but
the federal statute spoke of Indians. "Yet he is not an Indian; and the
137. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 569-70 (1846).
138. Id. at 572. Here Chief Justice Taney built upon the Marshall Trilogy: Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). These
cases were and remain part of the foundation of federal Indian law.
In Worcester, Marshall recognized that treaties with the Cherokee Nation
honored the Cherokee right to self-government and that laws of the state of Geor-
gia claiming authority within the Cherokee Nation violated the power (plenary
power) of the federal government to be the exclusive entity to interfere with In-
dian nations. See id. at 555.
Cherokee Nation named Indian sovereign status to be that of "domestic depen-
dent nations," id. at 17, distinct from other foreign states, and characterized the
relation (the trust relation) of Indian nations and the United States as "a ward to
his guardian." Id. Marshall also imagined the legal assertion of a right and
prayer for just treatment by an Indian nation: "their appeal was to the toma-
hawk." Id. at 18.
Johnson recognized the sovereign nature of Indian nations and their capacity
to engage in treaties, but assigned them an inferior status due to the "actual state
of things," id. at 590, and their character as "fierce savages." Id. at 589. The
"discovery doctrine" also stems from Johnson. By this doctrine the first Euro-
pean "discovery" gave legal title to all the land to the discovering European na-
tion subject to an Indian "title of occupancy" which could only be transferred to
the European discoverer. See id. at 563-593.
139. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. Chief Justice Taney also authored the infamous
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856), where he similarly re-
ferred to blacks as "this unfortunate race." See generally SIDNEY L. HAMRNG,




exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the
Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,-of the family of Indians
.140
Chief Justice Taney then moved beyond the statutory language
and argued that peace would be difficult to preserve if white men of
every description might "at pleasure settle among [the Cherokee],
and, by procuring an adoption by one of the tribes, throw off all re-
sponsibility to the laws of the United States."' 4 ' Yet adoption or natu-
ralization was in the arena of Cherokee law and no one could become a
Cherokee citizen without its authority.142 And, the Cherokee had an
effective police and judicial system.'4 3 Perhaps, of most importance
was Chief Justice Taney's final axiological, value driven argument:
Congress could not have intended to grant exemption from federal
criminal jurisdiction "to men of that class who are most likely to be-
come Indians by adoption, and who will generally be found the most
mischievous and dangerous inhabitants of the Indian country."' 44
The proviso then did not apply to Rogers and Nicholson. Indian
nations, domestic dependent sovereigns by federal legal ascription,
were spoken of only as native tribes. Indians, the justice of federal
relations put aside, were an unfortunate race now under the care of
the United States who would enlighten their minds and save them
from the consequences of vice. Federal law, at least the statute here,
did not use "Indian" as a short hand for many nations, but as a racial
classification. The "tribes" could not control their own internal affairs
with the needed skill, particularly if they were so stupid as to allow a
white man to live among them. Finally, any white man who would
leave his nation and his race must be a degenerate.
But, did not the Cherokee have a treaty with the United States
that promised to honor and protect their independence?
The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the
Cherokee nation in the forgoing article shall, in no future time without their
consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or
140. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
141. Id. at 573.
142. See Karen M. Woods, A "Wicked and Mischievous Connection": The Origins of
Indian-White Miscegenation Law, 23 LEGAL STuD. F. 37, 61-68 (1999). Woods
describes the long concern of the Cherokee about intermarriage and Cherokee
citizenship. For instance, "Socrates" wrote in an 1828 article for the Cherokee
Phoenix that stricter laws were needed to exclude the thief, robber, vagabond,
tipler, and adulterer from the privilege of intermarrying with Cherokee women.
The Cherokee Nation took to the idea and heavily regulated the matter. The
Cherokee also strictly prohibited Cherokee-black marriages, allowing only one
narrow exception, and, along with the Catawbas, turned against blacks in an ef-
fort to seek succor of their white neighbors. Id.
143. See RENARD STRicxLAND, FIRE AND THE SpiRITs, 168-74 (1975).
144. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
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Territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by their
national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem
necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property
within their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have
connected themselves with them: provided always that they shall not be in-
consistent with the constitution of the United States and such acts of Con-
gress as have been or may be passed regulating trade and intercourse with the
Indians; and also, that they shall not be considered as extending to such citi-
zens and army of the United States as may travel or reside in the Indian coun-
try by permission according to the laws and regulations established by the
Government of the same.145
Chief Justice Taney might have concluded that the treaty and its
particular promises to the Cherokee, "their people, or such persons as
have connected themselves with them,"14 6 controlled the general lan-
guage of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834. However, Chief Jus-
tice Taney did not imagine nations, but rather races. He thus read the
treaty stipulation that Cherokee law not be inconsistent with federal
law as indicating that the treaty was not intended to alter any part of
the act passed just a few months earlier. Yet, he did not specify what
would be inconsistent.
It would have seemed an honorable and coherent notion to protect
Cherokee sovereignty by reading the treaty and statute as recognizing
Cherokee jurisdiction over their people, as defined by the Cherokee
Nation. And, it would have been consistent with federal policy to do
so. Certainly it would have been consistent with federal policy to en-
courage Indian nations that adopted ever more European legal forms.
Inconsistency must have arisen in the imagination of race. "He was
still a white man, of the white race . . ."147
The circuit court's first question was not race-based and the Su-
preme Court did not offer any answer relating to rights of expatria-
tion. The circuit court's second question was not answered regarding
exclusive citizenship in the naturalizing nation, and the idea of dual
citizenship was not considered.148 Rogers could be a Cherokee for
Cherokee purposes, but federal law would only see his citizenship in
the United States, which was presumed without arguments to con-
tinue. As to the many who is an Indian issues, the Supreme Court's
response to the Circuit Court's third question only made clear that for
federal purposes race was going to be the determinant.
145. Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481.
146. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
147. Id.
148. When an American citizen who is also a citizen of another nation sues in federal
court, his American citizenship usually governs for diversity purposes. See New-
man-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989). A theory of dominant




"Indians and Whites do not exist .... Indian and White represent
fabled creatures, born as one in the minds of seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century European thinkers trying to make sense of the modern
experience ... ."149 There is not a White nation nor any Indian na-
tion, though there is Greenland and India. There are today more than
556 Indigenous nations recognized by the United States.1i 0 And, al-
though "courts have consistently recognized that one of an Indian
tribe's most basic powers is the authority to determine questions of its
own membership,"'5 i every instance of federal law distributing juris-
dictional sovereign authority includes a question of racial criteria for
those to whom it applies. The Rogers case is not an isolated and nar-
row manifestation of federal Indian law, but rather a fourth pillar
which with the Marshall Trilogy1 5 2  is the base of current
understanding.
One year after the Rogers decision, the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Arkansas was again faced with a jurisdictional question involv-
ing an adopted Cherokee in United States v. Ragsdale.'53 Thomas
Ragsdale, a Cherokee Indian, was indicted for the murder of Richard
Newland, a white man who became a Cherokee by marriage to a Cher-
okee woman in 1835. When the Cherokee were removed from the Mis-
sissippi area in 1835, Newland was removed with them and continued
to be recognized as a Cherokee at the time of the alleged murder. Rag-
sdale entered a plea of not guilty and an issue of a prior pardon under
the second article of the Treaty of Washington concluded with the
Cherokee on August 6, 1846.154
All difficulties and differences heretofore existing betveen the several parties
of the Cherokee nation are hereby settled and adjusted, and shall, as far as
possible, be forgotten and forever buried in oblivion. All party distinctions
shall cease, except so far as they may be necessary to carry out this convention
or treaty. A general amnesty is hereby declared. All offences and crimes com-
mitted by a citizen or citizens of the Cherokee nation against the nation, or
against an individual or individuals, are hereby pardoned.1 5 5
The issue was whether both Ragsdale and Newland were Cherokee
for the purpose of the pardon provision of the treaty. District Judge
Johnson started off with reference to Rogers, but he had a focus that
recognized the sovereign, even if diminished, status of the Cherokee.
They were dependent nations and always had the power to adopt
149. Jean-Jacques Simard, White Ghosts, Red Shadows: The Reduction of North
American Natives, in THE INVENTED INDIAN 333 (J. Clifton ed., 1990).
150. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 65 Fed. Reg. 13298 (Mar. 13, 2000).
151. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 20.
152. See cases cited supra note 138.
153. 27 F. Cas. 684 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113).
154. Id. at 685.
155. Treaty with the Cherokees, Aug. 6, 1846, art. 2, 9 Stat. 871, 871-72.
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others as members. And, Judge Johnson quoted language in Rogers
as expressly affirming such power in the Cherokee.15 6
Chief Justice Taney had said that a white man may become a
member of an Indigenous nation, but they were not "Indian" for pur-
poses of the exception to federal criminal jurisdiction. Judge Johnson
did not miss the distinction. He looked to the purpose and language of
the treaty pardon provision which referred not to "Indian" but to "citi-
zen or citizens of the Cherokee Nation."15 7 One of the treaty purposes
was to restore peace among hostile factions of the Cherokee and to
bury past differences in oblivion. Thus he concluded:
In this plenary pardon to all native born Cherokees, why should it not also
extend to adopted members of the tribe? After adoption they became mem-
bers of the community, subject to all the burdens, and entitled to all the im-
munities of native born citizens or subjects; and it is reasonable, in my
judgment, to suppose that they were intended to be included in the general
amnesty.1 5 8
It would be fifty years before another issue of a naturalized or
adopted non-racial citizen of an Indigenous nation came before the Su-
preme Court in a matter of Indian nation or United States jurisdic-
tion. However, two cases of "Indian" identity and jurisdiction in the
early 1890s should be noted. First, In re Mayfield59 held that an
adultery prosecution against a Cherokee defendant was a proceeding
in which a Cherokee was the "sole party" and that Cherokee courts
consequently had exclusive jurisdiction.
John Mayfield was convicted of adultery with a white woman
under a federal statute. Mayfield claimed to be a Cherokee by blood
and the prosecution stipulated that he was one-fourth Indian by blood,
and a citizen of the Cherokee tribe of Indians. Mr. Justice Brown held
for the Court that Mayfield was a member of the Cherokee Nation, "by
adoption, if not by nativity."160 Consequently, statute and treaty pro-
visions gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Cherokee.
An 1890 act of Congress for the Territory of Oklahoma provided in
its thirtieth and thirty-first sections that Indian nations or "the civi-
lized nations" should have exclusive jurisdiction where "members of
the nation by nativity or adoption shall be the only parties,"161 or
"wherein members of said nations, whether by treaty, blood, or adop-
tion, are the sole parties."16 2 These statutes confirmed for the Court
the continuing force of an earlier treaty with the Cherokee in 1866
156. United States v. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 685-86 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113).
157. Treaty with the Cherokees, Aug. 6, 1846, art. 2, 9 Stat. 871, 872.
158. Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 686.
159. 141 U.S. 107 (1891).
160. Id. at 116.
161. Id. at 115 (quoting Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 30, 26 Stat. 81, 94 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1994))).
162. Id. at 26 (quoting Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 180, § 31, 26 Stat. 81, 94).
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which promised that Cherokee Courts would be the single jurisdiction
for cases where the only parties are "members of the nation, by nativ-
ity or adoption."1 63
The Court did not explain why Mayfield was the sole party. How-
ever, it did note in reference to another treaty provision that the per-
son with whom the adultery was claimed to have been committed was
not adverse, but consenting. Further, the case was not brought by
Mayfield's wife if the crime of adultery could be considered as against
her.164
The second case, Famous Smith v. United States,165 involved the
Indian against Indian crime exception to federal jurisdiction. Famous
Smith, convicted of murder, was an undisputed Cherokee. The ques-
tion focused on his victim, Kajo Gentry. The trial judge had instructed
the jury that they must find that Gentry was "a white man"; meaning
by this a "jurisdictional citizen of the United States.' That if he were,
notwithstanding the defendant was an Indian, the court still had
jurisdiction."166
The facts showed Gentry's father to have been "either of Cherokee
blood or mixed Creek and Cherokee."167 He was "recognized as an
Indian," and was enrolled, and participated in the payment of "bread
money" to the Cherokees.i6s The prosecution offered that Gentry had
been denied participation in a Cherokee election, had lived for some
time in Arkansas, and had come to the Cherokee Nation by way of the
Choctaw Nation. The prosecution's theory was that Gentry had sev-
ered his relation with the Cherokee.16 9
Mr. Justice Brown held for the Court that the prosecution must
prove Gentry was, "a white man and not an Indian," and concluded
that the prosecution's evidence failed to do so.1 70 The conviction was
set aside.
163. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, 803. In
1854 Congress put the final touches on what is today the Indian Country Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). Of importance here it added a provision exempting
from federal jurisdiction, "any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses [is or] may. . . be secured to... [the] Indian tribes,
respectively." Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270. See generally
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 287-300 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994)).
164. In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 113 (1891); cf. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602
(1916) (holding relations of Indians among themselves only controlled by Con-
gress when clearly expressed).
165. 151 U.S. 50 (1894).




170. Id. at 55. The disallowed vote was due to a residency requirement in the particu-
lar Cherokee voting district and living for a while in Arkansas did not by itself
establish abandonment of Cherokee citizenship.
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Mayfield and Famous Smith did not involve non-racial members of
Indigenous nations, but they do indicate some change and some con-
tinuity in the problem of who is an "Indian" for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Federal statutes dealing with a particular territory had
jurisdictional rules phrased in terms of members by nativity or adop-
tion. Treaties, always nation to nation, also referred to citizens or
members. Consequently, the argument that "Indian" in a general ju-
risdictional statute means race, not nationality, might sometimes be
avoided. And, no question was raised against a naturalized (perhaps)
member that was a racial "Indian." However, since 1871 treaty rela-
tions have been prohibited with Indian nations.1 71 Consequently, the
opportunity to secure jurisdiction for all Indigenous nation citizens by
treaty is no longer available.
The Courts continued to look at "Indian" as the opposite of a "white
man." Although the Supreme Court in Famous Smith found that the
United States had not met its burden of proof, it was not bothered by
the trial court's or its reference to a jurisdictional citizen of the United
States as "a white man." Little had changed from the pre-civil war
role of race in Rogers. Those owing allegiance to or receiving protec-
tion from the federal or Native sovereigns were racial phantoms
rather than flesh and blood political actors.
From 1895 to 1897, four cases came before the Supreme Court with
jurisdictional issues involving adopted or naturalized, but non-racial
members of Indian nations. In Westmoreland v. United States,172
Thomas Westmoreland was convicted of the murder of Robert Green.
The only records before the Court were the indictment, the judgement,
and the motion in arrest thereof. The indictment described West-
moreland and Green as "white person[s] and not... Indian[s], nor...
citizen[s] of the Indian Territory."173 The events took place within the
Chickasaw Nation and the trial was in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Texas.
The defendant argued the Indian against Indian exception to fed-
eral jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Brewer began with the Rogers holding
that "Indian" is a racial term for purposes of the Indian against Indian
exception. But, Westmoreland had one more card to play. The Treaty
of 1866 with the Choctaws and Chickasaws provided that:
Every white person who, having married a Choctaw or Chickasaw, resides in
the said Choctaw or Chickasaw nation, or who has been adopted by the legis-
lative authorities, is to be deemed a member of said nation, and shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations according to his
domicile, and to prosecution and trial before their tribunals, and to punish-
171. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566; see VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND
DEMALLIE, I DocUMENTs OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY, 233-48 (1999).
172. 155 U.S. 545 (1895).
173. Id. at 546.
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ment according to their laws in all respects as though he was a native Choc-
taw or Chickasaw.
1 7 4
Consequently, Westmoreland claimed that the indictment should
have negatived the possibility of membership by marriage or adoption
to avoid the treaty exclusivity provision that was now in the Federal
jurisdictional statute: "This section shall not extend to ... any case
where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such of-
fenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively."1'75
The Court held that the indictment was sufficient to negate all pos-
sible citizenships in the Chickasaw Nation. It had charged that West-
moreland was a "white person, and not an Indian, nor a citizen of the
Indian Territory." As a result, the sufficiency of the indictment being
the only issue, the conviction was affirmed. 176
In Alberty v. United States,177 Alberty had been convicted in fed-
eral court for the murder of Phil Duncan, an illegitimate child of a
Choctaw Indian and a Negro woman who was at the time of Duncan's
birth a slave in the Cherokee Nation. The Court determined that
Duncan was, "a colored citizen of the United States."178 Alberty
would also seem to have been a Negro; however, by a treaty provision
Alberty was a citizen of the Cherokee Nation.17 9 Justice Brown
started with the now well settled notion that Alberty, although Chero-
kee, was not Indian.l8o
The 1866 treaty also had a jurisdictional provision that gave the
Cherokee exclusive jurisdiction in all cases where "members of the na-
tion, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties."1 8' And, the
most recent legislation to provide for the Territory of Oklahoma con-
tained a similar promise of exclusive Cherokee jurisdiction where
"members of said Nations, whether by treaty, blood, or adoption are
the sole parties." 8 2
The Court concluded that the "sole" or "only parties" language re-
ferred to the actual people involved in the crime.' 8 3 Justice Brown
174. Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Apr. 28, 1866, art. 38, 14 Stat. 769,
779.
175. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 30, 26 Stat. 81, 94 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1994)); Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, 10 Stat. 269; see also In re Mayfield, 141 U.S.
107 (1891) (granting writ of habeas corpus because petitioner was amenable only
to the courts of the Cherokee Nation).
176. Westmoreland v. United States, 155 U.S. 545, 546 (1895).
177. 162 U.S. 499 (1896).
178. Id. at 501.
179. The Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art. 9, 14 Stat. 799, 801,
provided that all freedmen who were at the time residents of the Cherokee Na-
tion would have all rights of native Cherokees.
180. Alberty, 162 U.S. at 501.
181. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, 803.
182. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 81, 96.
183. Alberty, 162 U.S. at 504-05.
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attempted to distinguish In re Mayfield as being a case where there
was no adverse party due to the consent of the woman to the charged
adultery.18 4 As a result, federal jurisdiction was upheld, but Alberty's
conviction was overturned due to errors in the trial court's instruc-
tions regarding self-defense and flight.185
A little more than a month after Alberty, the Court decided Lucas
v. United States.IS6 Lucas, a Choctaw, was convicted in federal court
for the murder of Levy Kemp, who was alleged in the indictment to
have been "'a negro and not an Indian."'1 8 7 An 1866 treaty with the
Choctaw provided in article three that the Choctaw would receive a
sum of $300,000 for cession of territory to the United States condi-
tional upon the Choctaw giving residents of African descent full citi-
zenship in the nation.1 8 8 In 1883, the legislature of the Choctaw
Nation adopted its freedmen as citizens.1 8 9 The same statute for the
Territory of Oklahoma at issue in Alberty was applicable here, and the
issue for the Court was whether the only parties were members of the
Choctaw Nation by nativity or adoption.
Justice Shiras found that the trial court had instructed the jury to
presume that Kemp, a Negro, was not a member of the Choctaw.190
The Court found this error, as the question should have been one of
fact for the jury without any presumption.19 1 Along the way it was
noted that Rogers was easily distinguished since in that case, "there
was no statute in terms extending jurisdiction of the Indian courts in
civil and criminal cases over their adopted citizens."i 92 Westmoreland
was never mentioned.
In January of 1897, the Court issued its opinion in Nofire v. United
States.i 93 Nofire and others, "full-blooded Cherokee Indians,"194 were
convicted in the federal court and sentenced to hang for the murder of
Fred Rutherford. The indictment charged that Rutherford was "'a
white man and not an Indian."" 95 However, evidence was offered to
prove that he was an adopted member of the Cherokee Nation by mar-
184. Id. at 504.
185. Id. at 510-11.
186. 163 U.S. 612 (1896).
187. Id. at 612.
188. Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Apr. 28, 1866, art. 3, 14 Stat. 769,
769.
189. Lucas, 163 U.S. at 614.
190. Id. at 615-16.
191. Id. at 617.
192. Id. at 616. Actually Rogers itself would seem to recognize that Indian institutions
would have authority over adopted members. Rather, it was a statutory excep-
tion to federal jurisdiction for adopted non-racial citizens that distinguished the
cases.
193. 164 U.S. 657 (1897).




riage.' 9 6 The federal jurisdictional law was the same as in Alberty,
i.e., specific treaty and statutory provisions promised that the Chero-
kee courts would have exclusive jurisdiction when all parties were
members of the nation, by birth or adoption.' 9 7
The jurisdictional issue being clear, the only question before the
Court was the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Rutherford's mar-
riage. The Court reversed the trial court and found that the facts es-
tablished Rutherford's marriage in accord with Cherokee law and
thereby his membership in the nation. The case was remanded with
instructions to surrender the defendants to the authorities of the
Cherokee Nation.' 9 8
Nofire is the last Supreme Court case dealing with jurisdictional
authority over naturalized or adopted non-racial citizens or members
of an Indian nation. And, it might seem that it signals a recognition
that such a person would be treated by federal law as an "Indian" for
jurisdictional purposes.' 9 9 However, the cases just considered make it
clear that "Indian" in federal criminal jurisdiction statutes remained a
racial term. Adopted or naturalized non-racial members of Indigenous
nations would be recognized by federal law only when a treaty and/or
statute specifically referred to citizens or members of the nation by
blood or adoption. Today such treaty provisions are forbidden and rel-
evant primarily as history; only indirectly offering insight to jurisdic-
tion matters.20 0
196. Id. The opinion details the constitutional and statutory law of the Cherokee that
controlled citizenship and marriage.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 659-62. Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897), applied the same
Cherokee treaty and specific statutory jurisdictional provisions to a civil case,
finding that only Cherokee courts had jurisdiction in a divorce involving a non-
racial adopted Cherokee. See generally Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931 (Okla. 1911)
(recognizing divorce by law of the Pottawatomie Nation as to non-racial natural-
ized Pottawatomie and non-Indian wife).
199. This argument is made in Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian
Land: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 503, 516 n.60
(1976).
200. Since 1871 the federal government has refused treaty relations with the Indian
nations. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566. Oklahoma statehood
also rearranged the playing field. See HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 781-85. See
generally F. Browning Pipestem & G. William Rice, The Mythology of the
Oklahoma Indians: A Survey of the Legal Status of Indian Tribes in Oklahoma, 6
Ai. INDIN L. REV. 259, 293-302 (1978) (describing the status of the Five Civi-
lized Tribes prior to 1890). Consequently, the treaty exclusivity provision in the
Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994), is for today's purposes a
dead letter. See United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 389 F.
Supp. 235 (D. Neb. 1975), affd 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976).
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B. The Rogers Legacy-Racial Jurisdiction
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Unites States v. Rogers201 remains
a vital part of current federal Indian law. With the Congressional de-
cision to end treaty relations with the Indian nations in 1871, any op-
portunity for treaties referencing "citizens" 20 2 of the particular Indian
nation or promising exclusive Indian jurisdiction in cases where all
parties are "members... by nativity or adoption,"203 was ended. To-
day jurisdictional questions turn on "Indian" in the criminal jurisdic-
tion statutes and that term is understood as it was by Chief Justice
Taney: "It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race
generally."2 04
1. Federal Criminal Cases
Federal courts begin with a citation to Rogers, usually stating a
version of the following: "[Tihe term 'Indian' has not been statutorily
defined but instead has been judicially explicated over the years. The
test, first suggested in United States v. Rogers and generally followed
by the courts, considers (1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or
government recognition as an Indian."205
The "Indian" test then contains two questions: (1) how much blood;
and (2) what counts as tribal or government recognition? The focus in
this Article is on naturalization and blood, or descent, but it is neces-
sary to look briefly at the second issue-recognition. The Supreme
Court tells us:
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon impermissible classifi-
cations. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as "a
separate people" with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of
Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political communi-
ties; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "'racial' group consisting of'Indi-
ans' . . . ." Indeed, respondents were not subjected to federal criminal
jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled
members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 2 0 6
201. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
202. See Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. at 685.
203. In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 113 (1891) (quoting Treaty with Cherokee Indians,
July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, 803); see Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657
(1897); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896); Lucas v. United States, 163
U.S. 612 (1896); Westmoreland v. United States, 155 U.S. 545 (1895).
204. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573; see 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) (Indian Country
Crimes Act). All of the foundational cases involved early versions of this statute
and 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (Major Crimes Act).
205. United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 859 (1979)).
206. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (citation omitted) (quoting




Experience would give truth to these words if jurisdictional laws
distinguishing "Indians" from others looked to the law of the Indige-
nous peoples' political institutions. However, the Court in a footnote
to the quoted passage reminds us that enrolled membership is not a
requirement.20 7
Two recent federal cases use the Rogers test, blood and recognition,
to determine whether a child victim of abuse by a non-Indian defen-
dant was an "Indian" for the purpose of jurisdiction under the Indian
Country Crimes Act.20 In United States v. Lawrence, the Eighth Cir-
cuit found the child victim not to be an "Indian" and affirmed a dismis-
sal of the indictment. 20 9 The victim was an "11/128ths Oglala Sioux
Indian," and the district court had presumed that to be within the
"requisite quantum of Indian blood."210 However, the victim failed
the recognition test: (1) enrollment, (2) federal government recognition
formally or informally through assistance reserved only for Indians,
(3) enjoyment of benefits of tribal affiliation, or (4) social recognition
via residence and participation in Indian social life.211 The child was
not enrolled, and eligible for enrollment only after completing a one-
year residency. Yet, the Oglala had intervened through their courts to
rescue the child from abandonment in Las Vegas, made her a ward of
the Oglala court, and placed her in the custody of her Oglala grand-
mother. The court concluded that there was not sufficient
recognition. 21 2
In United States v. Keys, the child victim was the daughter of an
enrolled member of the Colorado River Indian tribe who was "one-half
Indian blood," while the defendant father was "African-American."213
The conviction was upheld despite the defendant's argument that
since the victim was not enrolled, a finding that she was "Indian"
would be based on race and in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Keys court used the Rogers test, the issue being the second
part thereof, recognition:
Enrollment is not the only means to establish membership in a tribal political
entity. Here, the daughter's "Indian" status is based on the recognition by
207. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646 n.7.
208. The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994) (also known as the Gen-
eral Crimes Act, the Federal Enclaves Act, and the Interracial Crime Act) was in
early versions involved in all the foundational cases. It requires that either the
defendant or the victim be "Indian" and that the other not be. Id. See generally
United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 966 nn.3-4 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"interracial" is technically inaccurate, the better term being "inter-sovereign").
209. 51 F.3d 150 (8th Cir. 1995).
210. Id. at 152.
211. Id. at 152-54.
212. See id.
213. 103 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1996). There is not any notation of the father's quan-
tum of"African" blood or "American" blood.
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tribal institutions of her membership in the tribe. Her classification as an
"Indian" is not race-based and, consequently, Keys' prosecution under §1152
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
2 1 4
In Keys, the tribal recognition was established by the mother's calls to
Tribal Social Services, treatment of the child by Indian Health Ser-
vices, and the filing of a "child in need of care" petition in tribal
court.
21 5
Though sharing contrary results, Lawrence and Keys are recent ex-
amples of the continuing use of Rogers to determine "Indian" sta-
tus.216 The issue here is the federal law's focus on blood, but the
recognition factor is also telling. Blood and enrollment end the mat-
ter, but what of the idea that recognition may be found without enroll-
ment? Native nations all have some law determining membership in
the polity. If "Indian" status is political, how can the law of Native
nations be supplanted by a federal court's view of "recognition"? If the
political lens looks to the actions of the United States, why should fed-
eral action towards a person be determinative of that person's status
in another nation for purposes of jurisdiction?
2. State Criminal Cases
The federal criminal jurisdiction statutes deny states jurisdiction
in matters where they are applicable, and state convictions have been
challenged for jurisdiction in both federal2 17 and state courts. State
cases also employ the Rogers definition of "Indian." In State ex rel.
Poll v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court,218 the Montana Su-
preme Court dealt with a situation that was close, but distinct from
the old cases. One of the defendants, Don Juneau, was born of non-
Indian parents. However, under the law of Montana he was legally
adopted by a member of the Blackfeet Nation, Benton Juneau, and he
lived and worked all of his life in the Blackfeet Nation. He attended
Indian schools, practiced Indian religion, participated in Blackfeet cul-
ture, married a member of the Rocky Boy Nation, had Indian friends,
and had Indian children. He was not enrolled, did not vote in Black-
feet elections, did not hold any Blackfeet office, and did not receive
any federal benefits.2 1 9
214. Id. at 761.
215. Id. at 760.
216. See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d
770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir.
1976).
217. See Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938) (granting federal habeas to Indians
convicted in Wisconsin courts when Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 548, was
applicable).
218. 851 P.2d 405 (Mont. 1993).
219. Id. at 407.
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The Montana court cited Rogers and found that Don Juneau failed
both prongs of the "Indian" test; he did not have significant Indian
blood and did not have tribal or federal recognition. Thus, Montana
had jurisdiction.2 20
The case is particularly interesting for several reasons. First,
there are no cases in the criminal jurisdiction context raising an issue
of a naturalized non-racial member of an Indian nation after the 1897
case of Nofire v. United States. 22 i Poll222 concerned an adopted child,
but by the late twentieth century Indigenous culture made the Euro-
pean distinction between adoption and naturalization, 22 3 and Don Ju-
neau had not been naturalized by the Blackfeet. Of course, that raises
questions of whether that was either possible or desirable.
Second, a concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Trieweiler
agreed that the defendant failed the Rogers test, but argued that the
test was "antiquated" and failed to realize that "an inherent element
of tribal sovereignty is to enroll members, regardless of their degree of
Indian ancestry."2 24 Then, Justice Trieweiler argued that a proper
analysis in the case would have looked to federal preemption and a
balancing of federal, tribal, and state interests. The crimes involved
gambling offenses on the Blackfeet Nation's land and consequently
federal law and tribal interests should have prevailed to deny state
jurisdiction.2 25
The state cases rather uniformly use the Rogers test of "Indian" for
criminal jurisdiction.2 26 Yet, as in Poll, a judge sometimes questions
its appropriateness. In Vialpando v. State, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of Dennis Vialpando, holding that one-
eighth Indian blood is not a "substantial amount of Indian blood" and
that he did not have "'a racial status in fact as an Indian.'" 22 7 Vial-
pando was "by blood one-eighth Shoshone Indian"; not an enrolled
member; had been treated at the Bureau of Indian Affairs hospital;
lived in the Shoshone Nation for many years; hunted under an Indian
220. Id. at 407-08. The Montana courts had earlier adopted the Rogers test. See State
v. La Pier, 790 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1990).
221. 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
222. 851 P.2d 405 (Mont. 1993).
223. See id. at 407; see also In re Nelson, 327 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1972) (holding that adop-
tion is not naturalization as a member of an Indian nation).
224. Poll, 851 P.2d at 410 (Trieweiler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Id. at 411-15.
226. See, e.g., State v. Atteberry, 519 P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Sebastian, 701
A.2d 13, 23, 26, 39 (Conn. 1997); State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1988); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986-88 (Mont. 1990); Goforth v. State,
644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. St. Cloud, 465 N.W.2d 177,
179 (S.D. 1991); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 932-33 (Utah 1992).
227. 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982). The "racial status in fact" language comes from Ex




permit; attended Shoshone cultural events; and had suffered racial
discrimination as an Indian.228 He failed the Rogers test.
In another less than sanguine acceptance of race based status, Jus-
tice Rooney concurred that Vialpando was not "Indian" for jurisdic-
tional purposes.229 Nevertheless, Justice Rooney said, "racism is an
improper factor upon which to resolve matters such as this. Indian
sovereignty would be a more satisfactory basis...." 230 However, Jus-
tice Rooney also thought Indian sovereignty was "only a facade which
hides the true status of Indians."231 Justice Rooney's views of Indian
sovereignty notwithstanding, he believed that tribal sovereignty did
provide that a tribe could determine its own nationals. Consequently,
as the Shoshone had not enrolled the defendant and he was not eligi-
ble for enrollment, the state conviction was permissible. 232
C. The Disappearance of the Non-Racial Naturalized Indian
Although the law of United States v. Rogers233 remains a vital part
of federal Indian law, the factual circumstance of adopted or natural-
ized non-racial citizens of Indian nations has disappeared from re-
ported cases and perhaps no longer exists. There is little, if any,
scholarly writing devoted to the phenomenon, but a few recent works
discuss the federal role in Indian identification. M. Annette Jaimes
argues that it is an inherent element of sovereignty to determine a
nation's citizenry or membership and that federal policy defining In-
digenous nation membership by "blood quantum" or "degree of Indian
blood" is "racist" and has "genocidal implications."234 Ward Churchill
has described federal definitions of membership, foisted upon and
adopted by Indian nations, as the "most advanced and refined itera-
tion of imperialism."235 Both Jaimes and Churchill refer to the 1887
General Allotment Act as a crucial moment in the implementation of
federal Indian identity policy.23 6
The General Allotment Act parceled out land in severalty to indi-
vidual Indians.237 The congressional reformers hoped to assimilate
228. Vialpando, 640 P.2d at 81.
229. Id. (Rooney, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 82-83.
233. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
234. See M. Annette Jaimes, Federal Indian Identification Policy, in THE STATE OF
NATIVE AMERICA 123, 126, 133, 136 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992); cf RUSSELL
THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SuRvIVAL: A POPULATION HISTORY
SINCE 1942, at 186-224 (1987) (discussing the role of census population defini-
tions in counting Indians).
235. Churchill, supra note 17, at 40.
236. Id. at 50; Jaimes, supra note 234, at 126.
237. General Allotment Act, Feb. 8, 1882, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
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Indians into a small agrarian culture by having them become land-
owners and by associating with new non-Indian neighbors who would
be allowed to homestead on unalloted land. A similar program was
later applied to the Indian nations of Oklahoma.23s Justice Scalia has
said, "The objectives of allotment were simple and clear cut: to extin-
guish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the
assimilation of Indians into society at large."2 39
The foundation of allotment was the production of formal rolls list-
ing the members of each nation that would be eligible for an allotment
of land. The federal agent sent to each Indian nation was responsible
for these rolls and they relied heavily on blood-quantum. Not less
than one-half degree of blood was a typical standard and rarely did
the standard slip below quarter-blood. Blood also was used to expand
or contract the restrictions on the land allotted, with the preferences
to those of less Indian blood.240
By the first years of the twentieth century, Indian nations had
their polity determined by federal administration. Moreover, blood
had been made an engine of destruction turning Indigenous citizens
against each other. Today blood is a membership requirement in
many Indian nations. 243 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934242
ended the allotment policy and provided for the establishment of fed-
erally approved tribal governments with constitutions and bylaws
drafted by federal lawyers.243 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
also focused on blood and descent:
The term "Indian" as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian de-
scent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal ju-
risdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on
June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reserva-
tion, and shall fiurther include all other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood.2 44
238. See id.; HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 130-38, 784-88; FRAcis PAUL PRUCHA, II
THE GREAT FATHER 743-57 (1984).
239. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992).
240. See Churchill, supra note 17, at 50; Jaimes, supra note 234, at 126.
241. In a letter from Mr. Duane T. Bird Bear, Chief, Division of Tribal Government
Services, Office of Tribal Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs (June 18, 1999) to
John R. Snowden, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, Mr. Bird Bear
stated that the BIA does not keep a table or chart of tribal membership criteria.
However, he reported that in 1991 a partial listing of 155 tribes (excluding
Alaska, California, and Oklahoma) indicated that 97 tribes had a one-fourth de-
gree requirement, 16 had one-half degree, 11 had one-eighth, 3 had one-six-
teenth, 1 had three-eighths, 1 had one-sixty fourth, and 26 did not set any
minimum.
242. June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 984.
243. See HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 149-51.
244. Indian Reorganization Act, June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994)).
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John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the time of the
IRA, was a proponent of blood and descent as the earmark of Indian
identity. In a circular to Superintendents and Field Agents doing IRA
work, Collier stressed that the policy of the federal government would
be to give close scrutiny to constitution and bylaw membership provi-
sions. Further, provisions for adoption of non-members should re-
quire approval by the Secretary. "It is important that the Indians not
only shall understand this policy but shall appreciate its importance
as it applies to their own welfare through preventing the admission to
tribal membership of a large number of applicants of small degree of
Indian blood."245
As the Indian nations adopted IRA constitutions with the federal
model of blood-quantum membership, the last step was completed for
the internalization of colonial racial identity law. Now the federal
government could rely on the Indian nations to articulate its race laws
and point to the nations as being responsible for their existence. "A
more perfect shell game is impossible to imagine."2 46
The last cases involving non-racial naturalized citizens of the In-
dian nations all stem from struggles over who would be entitled to
allotment parcels of land. In the so-called Cherokee Intermarriage
Cases, the Supreme Court construed Cherokee laws of citizenship and
naturalization as excluding non-Indian adopted members from prop-
erty rights and thus from allotment. 24 7 The Cherokee law, after an
1875 amendment, allowed non-racial adopted members political par-
ticipation, but denied such citizens rights of soil or interest in the
vested funds of the nation.2 48 The Court recognized that an Indian
nation could change its citizens' status, and as it had once been in
England there could be distinct classes of citizens. 24 9
In United States ex. rel. West v. Hitchcock,250 a naturalized non-
Indian member of the Wichita Nation sought mandamus to compel the
245. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR No. 3123; MEM-
BERSHIP IN INDIAN TRIBES (1935) (signed by Commissioner, John Collier, on file
with author); see also TASK FORCE No. 9, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMM'N I, FINAL REPORT 108-09 (1977) (discussing the recognition of defining "In-
dian" as a member of an Indian tribe).
246. Churchill, supra note 17, at 53.
247. Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (The Cherokee Intermarriage
Cases).
248. Id. at 82-86. Congress provided in 1888 that a white man could not, solely by
intermarriage, share in tribal property. See Act of Aug. 9, 1888, ch 818, § 3, 25
Stat. 392 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 181 (1994)). This statute did not apply to the
Cherokee.
249. Red Bird, 203 U.S. at 85; see also Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1897) (stating
Chickasaw Nation may take away citizenship of non-Indian naturalized mem-
ber). For discussion of the English practice of distinct classes of citizens, see
supra text accompanying note 40.
250. 205 U.S. 80 (1907).
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Secretary of the Interior to approve selection of an allotment. Justice
Holmes held that the Secretary's decision was unreviewable by stat-
ing, "some one must decide who the members are."2 51 It seemed clear
that the petitioner had been adopted by Wichita law. However, the
Secretary apparently denied the selection because the adoption had
not been approved by the Indian Office as required by regulations.
The relator contends that the validity of the adoption was a matter purely of
Indian law or custom, and that the Department could not take it under con-
trol. Probably it would have been unfortunate for the Indians if such control
had not been exercised, as the temptation to white men to go through an In-
dian marriage for the purpose of getting Indian rights is sufficiently plain.
We are disposed to think that authority was conferred by the general words of
the statutes. Rev. Stats. §§ 441, 463. By the latter section: 'The Commissioner
of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the man-
agement of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out of the Indian rela-
tions.' We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long-
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was
not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of
the rather helpless people concerned.2 5 2
Justice Holmes' view of Indian people and of whites who would as-
sociate with them was identical to that of Chief Justice Taney who had
sixty years before called Indians "this unfortunate race" and natural-
ized whites "the most mischievous and dangerous inhabitants of the
Indian country."25 3
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided two of the last three re-
ported cases involving naturalized non-racial members of an Indian
nation. Reed v. Clinton held that a contract of conveyance from a nat-
uralized white member of an Indian nation was void.2 54 The court
reasoned that the Congressional prohibition of conveyance of allot-
ments was plain and that they therefore could not examine the pur-
pose of the prohibition. 255
In Franklin v. Lynch, a white woman had become a naturalized
member of the Choctaw Nation.2 56 The United States Supreme Court
held that she could not convey an expectancy of an allotment by a war-
ranty deed executed before she had been officially naturalized by
Choctaw law and the allotment made.2 57 Congress had removed
alienation restrictions on allottees of the Choctaw Nation who were
"not of Indian blood."258 However, a prior statute stated that allotted
lands should not be affected by any deed made before patent of the
251. Id. at 86.
252. Id. at 84-85.
253. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
254. 101 P. 1055 (Okla. 1909).
255. Id.
256. 233 U.S. 269 (1914).
257. Id. at 272.
258. Id. at 271; see Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204.
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land.259 The Court then concluded that the woman, Emmer Sisney,
"cannot be treated as a white woman, for the purpose of conveying an
expectancy, and an Indian for the purpose of securing an
allotment."260
The last case involving a naturalized non-racial member of an In-
dian nation is In re Hawkins' Estate. 261 Margaret Hawkins, a white
naturalized member of the Choctaw Nation died intestate and without
issue. The laws of intestate succession would have resulted in an es-
cheat to the state. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
Margaret's husband, a Choctaw citizen, should inherit because of the
purpose of Congress to preserve Indian property and the law's disfa-
vor of escheats. 262 And with that, non-racial naturalized members of
Indian nations disappeared from the reported cases.
D. Blood Beyond Jurisdiction
In short, when the concept is membership, the interpretation should hinge on
whether the term is used as part of congressional power to control the prop-
erty of Indian tribes, in which case the congressional definition will govern, or
whether it is part of a statute designed to strengthen or protect tribal sover-
eignty, in which case the tribal definition must be ascendant. 2 6 3
Sovereignty is the focus here and particularly the sovereign power
to define citizenship. Sovereignty manifests itself in jurisdiction, the
authority to make and apply law. If Indian nation sovereignty is sec-
ond class, perhaps that is due to the racial nature of federal Indian
law. In this part a brief account will be offered of the role of blood and
descent in that law when the issue is not jurisdiction, but rather fed-
eral benefits or disadvantages for the people of the Indian nations.
When Congress controls the property of Indian nations, blood is in the
foundation.
The federal policy of racial identification of citizens of Indian na-
tions was formalized in the allotment era as field agents prepared
membership rolls of Indian nations for entitlement to allotment par-
cels of land. That policy, however, remains alive and well. In Sim-
mons v. Eagle Seelatsee,264 the plaintiffs hoped to acquire an interest
in an allotment despite a statue which provided that "only enrolled
members of the Yakima Tribes of one-fourth or more blood of such
259. Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1362, 32 Stat. 641, 642.
260. Lynch, 233 U.S. 269 at 272.
261. 223 P. 396 (Okla. 1924).
262. Id. at 398.
263. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 86 (3d ed. 1991). The au-
thors agree that sovereignty issues which focus on membership should be deter-
mined by the law of the Indian nations. However, sovereign power must also
extend to the control of property.
264. 244 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965).
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tribes shall take by inheritance or by will any interest. 2 6 5 The Court
held that Congress had full power to determine who gets what and as
to blood said:
It is true that in doing so it specified a minimum quantum of Yakima Indian
blood, but it seems obvious that whenever Congress deals with Indians and
defines what constitutes Indians or members of Indian tribes, it must necessa-
rily do so by reference to Indian blood. What was done here was in line with
what Congress had previously done.
... Indeed, if legislation is to deal with Indians at all, the very reference to
them implies the use of 'a criterion of race'. Indians can only be defined by
their race.2 6 6
Can you imagine: "Whenever Congress deals with Europeans, or
citizens of France, Germany, Spain, etc., it must refer to French blood.
Germans can only be defined by their race." Blood runs rampant in
federal Indian law. The sovereignty of a people will neither be
respected nor protected if they are imagined as racial ghosts.
Perhaps the single greatest federal benefit is recognition as an In-
dian nation. However, after Congress established the Indian Reor-
ganization Act in 1934, the policy of the Department of Interior was to
instruct its field agents and lawyers doing IRA work to create "Indian"
constitutions defining membership by blood.267 Consequently, citi-
zenship or membership provisions in Native nation constitutions reg-
ularly require a blood-quantum or descent.
The constitutions of four Native nations neighboring Nebraska are
good examples of blood based membership.
CONSTITUTION OF THE OMAHA TRIBE OF NEBRASKA
Article II - Membership
SECTION 1. The membership of the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska
shall consist of all living persons whose names appear on the official
265. Act of Aug. 9, 1946, ch. 933, § 7, 60 Stat. 968 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 607 (1994)).
266. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. at 814; see also United States v. Waller, 243 U.S.
452 (1917) (discussing the Clapp Amendment of 1887, in which Congress re-
moved alienation restrictions for Indians of mixed-blood, but continued the re-
strictions for full-blood Indians); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 234 U.S. 245
(1914) (same); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911) (upholding the constition-
alility of the Act of April 26, 1906, which placed alienation restrictions on full-
blood Indians with citizenship). See generally United States v. Ferguson, 247
U.S. 175 (1918) (holding that administrative finding of blood quantum is final).
But cf Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Andrus, 645 F.2d 858 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a final roll of blood quantum approved by Bureau of In-
dian Affairs cannot be changed by Secretary of Interior).
267. See supra text accompanying note 244; 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994); see also Churchill,
supra note 17, at 52-53. "With the embrace of the IRA constitutions by what were
proclaimed as solid majorities on most reservations, Euro-American definitions of
and constraints upon Indian identity were formally as well as psychologically and
intellectually internalized by Native America." Churchill, supra note 17, at 53.
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roll of the tribe prepared pursuant to Section 1 of the Act of September
14, 1961 (74 Stat. 508).
SECTION 2. Any person possessing aboriginal Omaha blood of the
degree of one-fourth or more, and not enrolled with any other tribe of
Indians, who is born after September 14, 1961, to a member of the
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, shall be enrolled as a member of the tribe
upon the filing by or on behalf of such person, with the secretary of the
tribal council, of a membership registration form prescribed by the tri-
bal council. In determining the degree of aboriginal Omaha blood, the
blood of any tribe other than Omaha shall be excluded.
SECTION 3. Any person who being a member of the Omaha Tribe
of Nebraska becomes a member of any other tribe of Indians shall au-
tomatically lose his or her membership in the Omaha Tribe of Ne-
braska. Any person who loses membership in the Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska shall not thereafter be entitled to membership in the
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, except as may be authorized by an ordi-
nance promulgated pursuant to Section 4 of this Article II.
SECTION 4. The tribal council shall have the power to promulgate
ordinances, subject to the approval by the Secretary of the Interior,
governing future membership, including adoption and loss of
membership.2 68
CONSTITUTION OF THE PONCA TRIBE OF NEBRASKA
Article II - Membership
SECTION 1. The membership of the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska
shall consist as follows:
(a) All persons listed and their lineal descendants on the tribal
rolls of April 1, 1934, January 1, 1935, and June 18, 1965, as compiled
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
(b) All persons entitled to be listed on the membership roll of June
18, 1965 who were not listed on the roll, notwithstanding the applica-
tion or appeal deadline dates of P.L. 87-629.
(c) No individual is eligible for enrollment to membership if at the
time they make application for membership in the Ponca Tribe of Ne-
braska they are currently enrolled with another federally recognized
Tribe, Band or group unless an application for relinquishment is made
with the other Tribe contingent upon enrollment with the Ponca Tribe
of Nebraska.
(d) Any person not otherwise eligible for enrollment for member-
ship in the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska shall be entitled to appeal a de-
nial of membership by the Enrollment Committee to the Ponca Tribal
268. OMAHA CONST. art. II, §§ 1-4 (amended 1966).
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Council and submit at such appeal clear and convincing evidence they
possess some degree of Ponca Tribe of Nebraska blood. After hearing
the appeal, membership shall be granted if the Ponca Tribal Council,
by a two-thirds vote, approves the application of said person for enroll-
ment into the membership of the Tribe. The decision of the Ponca Tri-
bal Council shall constitute a final determination.
SECTION 2. The Ponca Tribal Council shall have the power to
enact and promulgate resolutions and ordinances governing future en-
rollment of members and reinstatement of membership into the Ponca
Tribe of Nebraska.
SECTION 3. The Ponca Tribal Council shall establish an honorary
roster for persons adopted by the Tribe who do not meet the require-
ments for membership in the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska. Honorary
members shall not have the right to vote, hold office, or otherwise ex-
ercise the rights or receive benefits of the members of the Ponca Tribe
of Nebraska.269
CONSTITUTION OF THE SANTEE SIOUX
TRIBE OF NEBRASKA
Article II - Membership
SECTION 1. The membership of the Santee Sioux Tribe of Ne-
braska shall consist as follows:
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear or are entitled
to appear, on the official census roll of the Santee Sioux Tribe of Ne-
braska as of April 1, 1934, with the supplement thereto of January 1,
1935, provided that within one year from the adoption and approval of
this constitution and bylaws, additions and eliminations may be made
in said roll and supplement by the tribal council subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior. Persons enumerated in the
"McLaughlin roll" made under the act of March 4, 1917 (39 Stat.
1195), or their descendants, shall not be considered, by virtue of such
enrollment, to have established membership in the Santee Sioux Tribe
of Nebraska under this section.
(b) All children born to any member of the Santee Sioux Tribe of
Nebraska who is a resident of the Santee Sioux Reservation at the
time of the birth of said children.
(c) All children of any member who is not a resident of the reserva-
tion at the time of the birth of said children may be admitted to mem-
bership by the tribal council under ordinances made by the tribal
council and subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, provided
such children reside on the reservation at the time they made
application.
269. PONCA CONST. art. I, §§ 1-3 (1994).
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SECTION 4. Reinstatement. Request for reinstatement of tribal
members shall be made by written application to the membership
committee whose decision shall be subject to the approval of the tribal
council.
SECTION 5. Adoption. Request for adoption of an Indian who is a
nonmember of the tribe shall be made by written application to the
membership committee who shall make recommendation to the tribal
council. The decision of the tribal council shall be subject to popular
vote at the next annual election.
SECTION 6. The right of the issue from the marriage of descend-
ants with nonmembers to membership in this organization shall not
apply to those having less than one-fourth degree Indian blood; pro-
vided that this section shall not apply to any such issue whose names
appear on the official tribal and census rolls as of April 1, 1934, with
the supplement thereto of January 1, 1935.270
REVISED ENROLLMENT ORDINANCE
SECTION 2. FILING OF APPLICATIONS FOR ENROLLMENT.
Applications for enrollment with the Tribe must be made by all per-
sons whose names appear on the basic roll of April 1, 1934 and the
January 1, 1935 supplement and their descendants, on forms author-
ized by the Tribe and must be accompanied by a birth or/baptismal
certificate of the applicant. If a tribal official or the Superintendent
has knowledge of a minor or mental incompetent for whom an applica-
tion has not been filed, such official shall file an application for such
person. Applications for minors or mental incompetents who are liv-
ing with persons other than parents or legal guardians may be filed on
their behalf by the person responsible for their care. Applications for
enrollment must be filed with the Membership Committee which shall
screen or review all applications.
SECTION 3. APPEALS. A person rejected for enrollment shall be
advised in writing of the reasons for the action of the Tribal Council
and that the decision may be appealed to the Area Director of the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, within sixty (60) days following receipt of a re-
jection for enrollment notice. If the Area Director sustains the
decision of the Tribal Council, he shall notify the applicant of his deci-
sion and that his decision may be appealed to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs within sixty (60) days following receipt of the Area Di-
rector's decision. If the Area Director cannot sustain the decision of
the Tribal Council he shall instruct the Tribal Council to place the
applicant's name on the roll. The Tribal Council may appeal the deci-
sion of the Area Director to the Commissioner. Appeals to the Area
270. SANTEE SIoux CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 4-6 (1936).
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Director shall be filed with the Superintendent for forwarding to the
Area Director. Appeals from the decision of the Area Director shall be
filed with the Area Director within sixty (60) days from the date of
notice of his decision for forwarding to the Commissioner.
SECTION 4. BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proving eligi-
bility and entitlement for enrollment with the Santee Sioux Tribe of
Nebraska shall be upon the applicant. The April 1, 1934 and January
1, 1935 supplement official membership roll of the Santee Sioux Tribe
shall be the authoritative document to be used in establishing blood
quantum provided that blood quantum as shown on this roll be prop-
erly determined by the Tribal Enrollment Clerk with the guidance and
assistance of the Area Tribal Enrollment Officer through research of
all available Government records and documents.
SECTION 7. CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK. If an ap-
plicant is born out of wedlock, he shall be deemed to possess one-half
('/2) of the total degree of Santee Sioux Indian blood possessed by one
or both parents who are members of the Santee Sioux Tribe, the father
shall acknowledge paternity by signing a statement properly wit-
nessed and filed with the Membership Committee. Further, if the fa-
ther is a member and the mother is a non-member of the Santee Sioux
Tribe of Nebraska, the application must be accompanied by a written,
properly witnessed acknowledgment of paternity signed by the father
of the applicant. Orders by Courts of competent jurisdiction shall also
be considered as proof of paternity.
SECTION 8. REINSTATEMENT. That Article II, Section 4, be
properly satisfied and provides further that a condition of reinstate-
ment to tribal membership shall be the possession of 114 or more of
Santee Sioux Indian blood by all applicants.
SECTION 9. ADOPTION. In satisfaction of Article II, Section 5 of
the Constitution, "Non-members" shall mean those persons of Santee
Sioux ancestry not otherwise able to meet the constitutional member-
ship requirements, provided that a condition of adoption to tribal
membership shall be the possession of 1/4 or more of Santee Sioux
Indian blood by all applicants.271
CODE OF THE WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEBRASKA
Title 5 - Tribal Government
Article II - Membership
SECTION 1. The membership of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska
shall consist as follows:
271. SANTEE Sioux, REv. ENROLLimNT ORDnANcE, §§ 2-4, 7-9 (1967).
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(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear, or are entitled
to appear, on the April 1, 1934 official census roll of the Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska, or the January 1, 1935 supplement thereto: Pro-
vided that those persons who possess Winnebago blood and blood of
another tribe have not elected to be enrolled with the other tribe; and
provided further that those persons of Indian blood of tribes other
than Nebraska Winnebago, whose names appear on the basic roll as
"N.E.", shall not be considered as members of the Winnebago Tribe of
Nebraska; and provided further that persons of Winnebago Indian
blood born after the date of the basic roll and prior to the date of this
amendment may be enrolled if by January 1, 1967 they submit to the
tribal council a request, in writing, accompanied by such evidence as
is necessary to determine their qualifications for enrollment; and pro-
vided further that any Indian who may be eligible for membership in
the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, who has received an allotment of
land or received financial benefits as a member of another tribe, shall
not be enrolled.
(b) All persons who have been validly adopted as members of the
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska prior to the date this amendment is ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior.
(c) All children born to a member of the Winnebago Tribe of Ne-
braska after the date this amendment is approved by the Secretary of
the Interior, provided said children possess at least one fourth degree
Winnebago Indian blood.
SECTION 2. Any person who has been rejected as a member of the
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, except those rejected under section
1(b), shall have the right to appeal his case to the Secretary of the
Interior within ninety days from the date written notice of the rejec-
tion is issued to him/her, and the decision of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior shall be final.
5-102 Filing of applications for enrollment. Applications for en-
rollment with the tribe must be made on forms authorized by the tribe
and must be accompanied by a birth or baptismal certificate of the
applicant. If a tribal official or the superintendent has knowledge of a
minor or mental incompetent for whom an application has not been
filed, such official shall file an application for such persons. Applica-
tions for minors or for mental incompetents who are living with per-
sons other than parents or legal guardians may be filed on their behalf
by the person responsible for their care. Applications for enrollment
must be filed with the enrollment committee which shall screen and
review all applications.
5-103 Appeals. A person disapproved for enrollment shall be ad-
vised in writing of the reasons for the action of the tribal council and
that its decision may be appealed to the area director of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs within thirty days following receipt of a rejection for
[Vol. 80:171
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
enrollment notice. If the area director sustains the decision of the tri-
bal council, s/he shall notify the applicant of his/her decision and that
his/her decision may be appealed to the commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs within thirty days following receipt of the area director's deci-
sion. If the area director cannot sustain the decision of the tribal
council s/he shall instruct the tribal council to place the applicant's
name on the roll. The tribal council may appeal the decision of the
area director to the commissioner. Appeals to the area director shall
be filed with the superintendent for forwarding to the area director.
Appeals from the decision of the area director shall be filed with the
area director within thirty days from the date of receipt of notice of
his/her decision for forwarding to the commissioner.
5-104 Burden of proof. The burden of proving eligibility for enroll-
ment with the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska shall be upon the appli-
cant. The April 1, 1934 official membership roll and the January 1,
1935 supplement thereto shall be the authoritative document to be
used in establishing blood quantum, provided that errors in blood
quantum as shown on this roll may be corrected upon submission of
substantiating evidence.
5-107 Children born out of wedlock. If an applicant is born out of
wedlock, s/he shall be deemed to possess one half of the total degree of
Winnebago Indian blood possessed by one or both parents who are
members of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska. If both are members of
the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, the father shall acknowledge pater-
nity by signing a statement properly witnessed and filed with the en-
rollment committee. Further, if the father is a member and the
mother is a non-member of the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, the ap-
plication must be accompanied by a written, properly witnessed ac-
knowledgment of paternity signed by the father of the applicant.
Orders by court of competent jurisdiction shall also be considered as
proof of paternity.
5-110 Adoptions. Persons of one fourth or more degree Winnebago
Indian blood may be adopted into tribal membership, provided appli-
cation is made in writing to the tribal council. The tribal council after
proper investigation, shall submit to a vote of the tribal members at
the next tribal election the names of all applicants for adoption deter-
mined to be of at least one fourth degree Winnebago Indian blood.
These applicants approved by a majority vote of the tribal member-
ship voting in the election shall be accepted as members of the
tribe.272
272. WR-NEBAGO CODE, tit. 5, art. II, §§ 1-2, 5-102 to 5-104, 5-107, 5-110 (1994).
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
As a result of the Indian Reorganization Act constitutions, even
those federal statutes that define Indian beneficiaries as a "member of
an Indian tribe,"2 73 are based on blood or descent.
During the "termination era," the federal government ended fed-
eral recognition and the trust relation between itself and the termi-
nated nations.2 74 In 1970 President Nixon, convinced of the error of
termination policy, urged Congress to restore recognition to termi-
nated nations. The restoration acts in the following years usually
mandated descent or blood requirements for the membership of the
restored Indian nations.2 75 For example, the Menominee restoration
legislation required one-quarter blood,276 and the legislation for the
Yseltal del Sur Pueblo of Texas required one-eighth blood.277 Many
other restoration acts required descent.2 78
When Native nations have won claims against the United States,
the congressional distribution of judgment funds usually require de-
scent or blood. For example, distribution to the Duwamish required
descent from members as the nation existed in 1855.279 Distribution
of funds to the Omaha required one-quarter blood.280 Interestingly,
when the Omaha changed their constitution at this time to a one-
quarter blood membership requirement, it resulted in the loss of some
two hundred members at a time when the Omaha Nation was strug-
gling against the policies of the termination era.28 1
Blood flows in strange places. In United States v. Curnew,282 Ran-
dolph Curnew appealed his conviction on a charge of being unlawfully
present in the United States. Curnew based his defense on a statu-
tory right of "American Indians born in Canada" to pass freely over
the federal border. However, the right extends only to "persons who
273. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450b(d) (1994); see also Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-
based and Memberships-based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme
Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PrT. L. REv. 1, 82-83 (1993) (referring to varied
statutory definitions of "Indian" based on ancestry or membership as they appear
in several federal programs).
274. See HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 152-80.
275. Id. at 185-87, 817-18.
276. 25 U.S.C. § 903b(c) (1994).
277. 25 U.S.C. § 1300g-7(a)(2)(i) (1994); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1300 1-3(b) (1994) (Au-
burn, one-eighth blood); 25 U.S.C. § 711b(b)(1)(C) (Siletz, one-quarter blood); 25
U.S.C. § 713e(b)(1) (1994) (Grand Ronde, one-quarter blood); 25 U.S.C. § 715e(b)
(1994) (Coquille, one-eighth blood); 25 U.S.C. § 763(b)(1)(C) (1994) (Paiute, one-
quarter blood).
278. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 983e(b)(A)(B)(iii) (1994) (Ponca, lineal descendant); 25 U.S.C.
§ 714b(b)(1)(c) (1994) (Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw, direct lineal
descendant).
279. 25 U.S.C. § 1131(b) (1994); see e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1242 (1994) (Pembina Band of
Chippewa).
280. 25 U.S.C. § 967a (1994).
281. See MARK R. SCHERER, IMPERFECT VICTORIEs 67 (1999).
282. 788 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1986).
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possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American Indian
race."28 3 Curnew had no idea of his blood quantum, but would have
testified that he believed himself to be and was considered by others
"a full blooded Indian."28 4
Curnew retained a cultural anthropologist as an expert witness.
The expert testified that Curnew had some blood, but that it would be
irresponsible for her to opine as to the quantum of Indian blood with-
out more evidence. The court affirmed Curnew's conviction. 285
Chief Judge Lay dissented, believing that the blood quantum ques-
tion should have been left for a jury (Curnew entered a conditional
plea of guilty) and raised a pointed question about blood and race:
The initial burden placed on a defendant to even identify the members of a
family tree encompassing only three or four generations is prohibitively oner-
ous. However, under the majority's literal reading of the statute, going back
even four generations would likely not be sufficient since tracing ancestry that
far would hardly begin the process of tracing a "blood line" back to the pre-
Columbian age. The majority also leaves unanswered the question of how the
racial make-up of a defendant's more distant ancestors is to be determined,
even assuming the highly questionable premise that sufficient "bloodline" evi-
dence of his or her ancestors' identities would reasonably be available. 2 86
Finally, how about a job with the Bureau of Indian Affairs? In
Morton v. Mancari,28 7 the United States Supreme Court held that "In-
dian" employment preferences in the BIA as required by the Indian
Reorganization Act28 8 were neither repealed by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act of 1972 nor prohibited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.28 9 It was, said the Court, not a racial
preference, but one designed to further Indian self-government. 290
Yet, the preference eligibility criteria at the time required that an in-
dividual must be one-fourth or more Indian blood and a member of a
federally recognized tribe.291
The Indian Reorganization Act defined "Indian" and the BIA has
refined its preference criteria to better match the IRA.292 Neverthe-
less, both definitions require at least descent; some blood, but not too
much:
283. Id. at 1337 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994)).
284. Id. at 1339-40.
285. Id. at 1339.
286. Id. at 1340 (Lay, J., dissenting); see also United States ex rel. Goodwin v.
Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660 (W.D.N.Y. 1947) (leaving determination question open,
but interpreting plain statutory language as requiring blood).
287. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
288. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1994).
289. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 545-55.
290. Id. at 554.
291. Id. at 553 n.24.
292. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994) with 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2001).
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For purposes of making appointments to vacancies in all positions in the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs a preference will be extended to persons of Indian de-
scent who are:
(a) Members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
Jurisdiction;
(b) Descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation;
(c) All others of one-half or more Indian blood of tribes indigenous to the
United States;
(d) Eskimos and other aboriginal people of Alaska; and
(e) For one (1) year or until the Osage Tribe has formally organized,
whichever comes first, effective January 5, 1989, a person of at least one-quar-
ter degree Indian ancestry of the Osage Tribe of Indians, whose rolls were
closed by an act of Congress. 2 9 3
In 1976, the Final Report of Task Force No. 9 of the American In-
dian Policy Review Commission recommended that the preference cri-
teria required by the IRA be changed to require membership and one-
fourth degree Indian blood or that there be a two-tiered preference of
first members and one-quarter blood; then if none in that tier, mem-
bers and descent.2 94 The proposal argued that just a little blood,
descendancy, conflicted with congressional intent and the vision of
John Collier, the "prime architect" of the IRA, who had urged that
Indian welfare depended on "'preventing the admission to tribal mem-
bership of a large number of applicants of small degree of Indian
blood."295 As a preference criteria this was to assure that the pre-
ferred applicants would have knowledge of their nation and Indian
affairs. 29 6 One might, however, think that domicile in their Indian
nation, ability to speak their native language, references from fellow
members, or testing of understanding of their nation's history and cul-
ture might provide a better gauge than blood.
IV. NOW: LOOKING TO THE PAST; STEPPING
TO THE FUTURE
When we called ourselves the People we had harmony within our tribes. It
was after this other identity, of being the "Indians," was put upon us, that the
disharmony started within the tribes. 2 9 7
John Trudell
From the beginning those who came to this place should have
treated the Indian nations and Indian people with respect. There are
not any rules, principles, or promises of limit that can justify or excuse
293. 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2000).
294. See TASK FORCE No. 9, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEw COMIM'N, FINAL REPORT
201-02 (1976).
295. Id. at 200 (quoting OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, CIRCULAR No. 31, supra note 245.
296. Id. at 199.
297. Trudell, supra note 1, at 4.
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ideas and actions that treat another as one of less than equal dig-
nity.2 98 However, federal Indian law pretends to be just such a body
of doctrine, a redeeming ideal for the masking of colonial dominion
and racist arrogance. If federal Indian law is to become something
other than such a mask, it must see within itself the role played by
race and blood. Federal Indian law contaminated by blood confuses
Indian nation sovereignty with discredited notions of race and induces
Indian nations and Indian people to accept a European disease as a
manifestation of health.
We imagine that all people desire peace, love, and happiness; and
that they expect independence, freedom, and respect. These are ex-
pectations of sovereignty, the power of a people to determine the val-
ues of personhood, kinship, and right action. Sovereignty is
manifested in the peoples' institutions of social structure, the forma-
tion and articulation of public purposes, and the making of political
decisions. It is the contrary to federal Indian law.
Federal Indian law attempts to justify the colonization of the In-
dian nations. Its foundation, the Marshall trilogy, posits the discred-
ited doctrines and concepts of "discovery," "right of occupancy,"
"domestic dependent nations," the "guardian-ward" relationship of the
trust doctrine, and congressional plenary power.2 99 Marshall's law
was based on the "actual state of things" and the "character and hab-
its" of the Indigenous people.3OO It remains rooted in colonial desire
and racism.
United States v. Rogers3O' has been overlooked. However, it too is
foundational and like the trilogy exists as a vampire; using the blood
of the living to sustain the obscene undead. The vampire's illusion of
humanity makes human beings easy prey. Rogers and the strong cur-
rents of blood throughout federal Indian law trick both Indian and
non-Indian into seeing racial ghosts rather than embodied citizens of
separate sovereign nations who have promised to live in peace.3 0 2
298. But cf Exodus 21:2-6. Here Moses tells of the judgments from God regarding sale
and usage of servants. Perhaps this story, or its misunderstanding, is the source
of the idea that unjustified dominion may be tolerated if kept constant with rules.
299. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240, 543 (1823) (discussing the dis-
covery doctrine and the right of occupancy); see also Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that state law does not apply in Indian country, but
Congressional power is plenary); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831) (discussing the domestic dependent nation concept and the relation of
ward to guardian which yields the trust doctrine).
300. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 260-61.
301. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
302. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HAav. BLAcKLE-rER L.J. 107, 154-158 (1999) (arguing




The problem of Indians and the constitutional promise of equal
protection is handled by the premise that federal Indian law is based
on a political rather than racial relation.30 3 While we do not believe
that federal Indian law has legitimate authority to define by statute or
judicial ruling the sovereign status of Indian nations, the plenary
power of Congress and the status decisions of the Untied States Su-
preme Court remain an embarrassment to the law of the United
States. Were we to accept that law, however, Rogers and its progeny
give the lie to the political relation premise.
Court decisions interpreting the federal criminal jurisdiction stat-
ues do not focus on the political citizenship or membership of the par-
ties. Rather, they try to measure phantoms; race, substantial blood,
and recognition. That focus shows racial discrimination rather than a
respect for political relations. And, of equal import, it denigrates the
residue of sovereignty that federal Indian law has not destroyed. Ben-
efits and disadvantages given to Indian people on the basis of blood or
descent may affirm in their minds that they are a racial minority in-
stead of citizens or potential citizens of separate sovereigns whose ex-
istence depends on their political energy and imagination for a
future.3 0 4
Today treaties with Indigenous nations are forbidden. However,
statutes might promise that the federal distribution of jurisdiction
will look to the political decision of Indian sovereigns as to who are
their citizens. The Indian nations concerned should decide citizenship
issues for themselves, and statutes should be the result of consulta-
tion and agreement between the federal and Indian governments. Un-
til such government to government agreements become statute law,
the courts should end their reliance on Rogers and its focus on race.
303. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974); see also L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: the Predicament of
Tribes, 101 COLUM. L REv. 702 (2001). Professor Gould argues that the political,
not racial, principle is threatened by the decision in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000). "In view of the Rice Court's newly-expressed hostility to race-related
groupings, it would be precarious to conclude that Mancari is left unscathed." Id.
at 741. See generally David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991) (arguing against and for
this notion of equal protection applicability respectively); Carole Goldberg-Am-
brose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REv.
169 (1991) (same).
304. See Porter, supra note 302. Professor Porter argues that the Indian Citizenship
Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)),
was a genocidal act creating "Native Americans," a racial group, out of the citi-
zens of the Indian nations. As a result the individual's citizen-energy is dispersed
and Indigenous sovereignty is put at risk by the colonial nation's diminishment of
the role of the Indian nation in daily life and consciousness.
[Vol. 80:171
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
The Supreme Court's assertion in United States v. Antelope30 5 that
federal criminal jurisdiction is based not on the persons' Indian race,
but rather the parties' political relation as enrolled members of an In-
dian nation, is not the law. It is clear that the statutes' use of "Indian"
continues to be given the racial meaning acquired in Rogers. The Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment should prohibit that interpre-
tation. If "Indian" refers to political relations, then federal law must
look to the membership laws of the nations with whom such relations
exist.
In civil jurisdiction the law is not shackled by a precedent similar
to Rogers, and jurisdiction is not distributed by federal statutes. In
Williams v. Lee3 06 the Supreme Court recognized that Indian nations
have all sovereign rights not given away by treaty, taken by federal
statute, or lost by Supreme Court decisions which define their sover-
eign status as diminished.307 The Court then held that a non-Indian
plaintiff may not bring a civil suit in state court against a member of
an Indigenous nation when the member resides in the nation and the
cause of action arose in the Indian nation.3 08 Such a suit would in-
fringe on Indian sovereignty and may be permitted only if authorized
by Congress. The non-Indian plaintiff must sue in the courts of the
Indian nation. If there is a non-racial naturalized member of an In-
dian nation, they have not appeared in any civil jurisdiction case.
And, unlike the criminal cases, only one case has been found where
the Indian defendant is under the Williams v. Lee principle, although
not a citizen of the Indian nation in which the action arose.3 09
When cases of jurisdictional distribution arise which turn on the
nationality of a party, Indian nationality should be a matter of the law
of Indian nations. Jurisdiction is a matter of sovereignty and it is well
past the time for federal law to recognize that Indians are, like
Europeans, citizens of distinct nations.
There are signs that the Indigenous nations are looking with re-
newed interest at the make-up of their polity. A particularly notewor-
thy development in the citizenship law of Indian nations is found in
305. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
306. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
307. Id. at 222-23.
308. Id. at 223.
309. See Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975). In Nelson the defendant, Du-
bois, was an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa, but the
incident occurred within the boundaries of the Dakota Lake Sioux Tribe of the
Fort Totten Indian Reservation where Dubois resided. See also Found. Reserve
Ins. Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 734 P.2d 754 (N.M. 1987). In Garcia the defendants were
husband and wife. Both were citizens of Indian nations, but only the husband
was a citizen of the Indian nation in which they resided and the incident arguably
arose. The court applied the Williams v. Lee principle, but held that the action,
an insurance coverage dispute, did not arise within the Indian nation.
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the recent case of Means v. The District Court of the Chinle Judicial
District from the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation.310 Russell
Means, a citizen member of the Oglala Sioux Nation, resided in the
Navajo Nation and was married to an enrolled Navajo, Gloria Grant.
Means was charged with threatening and battering Leon Grant, a
member of the Omaha Nation and battering Jeremiah Bitsui, a mem-
ber of the Navajo Nation. All events were within the Navajo Nation.
Means argued that the Navajo courts lacked jurisdiction, and that if
jurisdiction was found, it would violate equal protection of the law be-
cause jurisdiction was based on race rather than political membership
in the Navajo Nation.3 11
The Navajo Supreme Court found jurisdiction in the June 1, 1868
Treaty between the United States of America and the Navajo Na-
tion.312 The Treaty promised that "this reservation" is "set apart for
the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians, and for such
other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they
may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit among
them .... ,,313 Consequently, though the Navajo Nation may not have
had inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, criminal
jurisdiction was established in the Treaty of 1868.314
The Navajo Supreme Court then turned to the promise of equal
protection of the law. Chief Justice Yazzie noted the Navajo Supreme
Court had earlier held that the Nation had criminal jurisdiction over
individuals who "'assume tribal relations." 31 5 Turning to Navajo
common law, the Chief Justice held that there were several kinds of
membership in the Navajo Nation. Means' citizenship was that of an
hadane (in-law), one who marries or has an intimate relation with a
Navajo. An hadane assumes a clan relation to a Navajo when the inti-
mate relationship is conducted within the Navajo Nation. As a result,
Means was not a non-member Indian subjected to criminal jurisdic-
tion because of race, but rather an hadane member of the Navajo
Nation.316
310. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6083 (Navaho May 11, 1999). Russell Means also filed in fed-
eral court for a writ of habeas corpus and/or a write of prohibition. The petition
was denied. See Russell Means v. Navaho Nation, CIV.99-1057-PCT-EHC (SLV)
(D. Ariz. Sept., 20 2001).
311. Means, 26 Indian L. Rep. at 6084.
312. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, art. 1, 15 Stat. 667.
313. Treaty with the Navaho Indians, June 1, 1868, art 2, 15 Stat. 668 (emphasis
added).
314. Means, 26 Indian L. Rep. at 6087.
315. Id.
316. Id.; see generally Paul Spruhan, Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial
District and the Hadane Doctrine in Navajo Criminal Law, TRIBAL L.J. (Fall
2000), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/means/INDEX.HTM.
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The opinion's two parts, jurisdiction and membership, raise inter-
esting questions. First, may any person become an hadane member?
Nothing suggests that hadane membership is only for racial "Indians."
Rather it is founded on an intimate relationship with a Navajo and
"longtime residence within the Navajo Nation."317 Second, is mar-
riage the only intimate relationship that with continued residency
may lead to hadane membership? The opinion said, "An individual
who marries or has an intimate relationship with a Navajo is a
hadane (in-law)."31i Finally, since jurisdiction was based on the 1868
Treaty promise that the Nation was for the Navajo and "other friendly
tribes or individual Indians," would a non-Indian hadane be such an
"Indian" or a Navajo for jurisdictional purposes?
Hadane membership brings a seeming disadvantage by subjection
to Navajo jurisdiction. However, the Means court notes that all people
within the Nation's boundaries have the advantage of being called for
jury duty.31 9 Would hadane membership have any other seeming ad-
vantages? Just as English law at one time distinguished between the
fully naturalized citizen by parliamentary act and the denizen by
royal patent who had only limited nights, Native nations might also
grant distinct status to different classes of citizens. 32 0 Perhaps, just
as they currently often distinguish among those members who live
within and without Indian country, native nations might distinguish
today, as at least the Cherokee once did, types of citizenship or
membership. 321
Perhaps there should be only one class of citizen, first class. How-
ever, as the Native nations look to their traditions, customs, and vi-
sions for the sustenance and nurture of the people, distinctions might
be considered.32 2 If a person was not to be a full-tilt member, might
that person, with an appropriate legal process, be able to serve on an
administrative board, serve on a jury, be entitled to a tribal public
defender, vote or run for some offices, and be eligible for some tribal
services? 323
317. Id. The court also says that, "One can be of any race or ethnicity to assume tribal
relations with Navajos." Id. at 6088.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 6085.
320. See supra text accompanying note 40.
321. See supra text accompanying note 248.
322. See Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from
The Edge of the Prairie, 31 Am. ST. L.J. 439, 472-75 (1999); Frank Pommer-
sheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial Thoughts,
14 T.M. CooL=Y L. REv. 457, 463-67 (1997).
323. See Pommersheim, supra note 322, at 463-67; see also Jennifer Edwards, Two
Plans Offered for Revised SRST Constitution, 1 LAKOTA NAT. J., Oct. 23-29, 2000,
at B1 (reporting that a group from Running Antelope District has submitted a
constitutional proposal allowing non-Indians married to an enrolled member to
vote in elections); Kootenai to Decide Tribal Membership, 20 INDI CouNTRY To-
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Perhaps today is the time to consider citizenship or membership
questions in light of the current values of Indian nations. What is
often seen, however, are stories describing recent disenrollments in
the Indigenous nations. The Seminole Nation in Oklahoma recently
voted to require a one-eighth Seminole blood enrollment requirement
and to change membership status from "'Seminole Citizens'" to "'Sem-
inole Indian citizens by blood.'"324 Freedmen, descendants of run-
away slaves who lived with the Seminole, were enrolled members
before the recent vote and made-up 1,927 persons of the 13,000 en-
rolled Seminoles. The citizenship status of these people is uncertain
after the change, but Seminole Enrollment Officer, Jane McKane, is
quoted as saying that if the BIA approves the election changes,
"'There will be no Freedmen members at all in the tribe.'"325
Jane McKane is reported to have said that part of the reasoning
behind the Seminole change was that the blood quantum was so low
that people enrolling were not interested in the nation.3 26 We are un-
sure of the relationship of blood and interest. We do understand the
ravages of greed.
From California come tales of Indian people disenrolling members
to apparently acquire more of the lucre from gaming. The Table
Mountain Rancheria has 120 people who claim to have been disenrol-
led.327 At Berry Creek Rancheria 30 some people fear disenroll-
ment.3 28 In Picayune Rancheria, Jane Wyatt, a disenrolled member,
is reported as saying that the Rancheria had disenrolled 500 people to
get some individuals a bigger slice of the pie.3 29 To the south, the Las
Vegas Paiute Nation is reported to have disenrolled fourteen mem-
bers, almost one-fourth of the adult population in a similar fight over
distributions of the nation's income from a tax-free smoke shop.33 0
Surely, Indian nation sovereignty and the human make-up of the pol-
ity might be directed to a vision beyond material wealth.
Citizenship carries the right to participate in the actions of a sover-
eign state and contributes to making the character of a nation. To
DAY, Oct. 11, 2000, at D5 (reporting that the Kootenai have proposed an enroll-
ment ordinance requiring future members to pass an examination testing
knowledge of the Kootenai's culture, history, and traditions, and must also have
one-quarter blood).
324. Mary Pierpoint, Seminole Nation Changes Tribal Enrollment, 20 INIAN CouN-
TRY TODAY, July 19, 2000, at Al.
325. Id. at A2.
326. Id. at Al.
327. Janes May, California: To be Indian or not to be, 20 INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Aug.
9, 2000, at Cl.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Valerie Tallman, Disenrolled Paiutes Fight for Heritage, 20 INDIAN COUNTRY To-
DAY, Sept. 27, 2000, at Al; Valerie Tallman, Las Vegas Paiute Police Chief Fired,
20 INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 4, 2000, at A8.
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what principle or principles do the different Indian nations look as
they consider their national character? Ascription as a citizenship
principle looks to matters of fate, place of birth, or descent. The
ascription principle seems also to carry traces of allegiance to a natu-
rally superior authority. Consent, on the other hand, looks to the free
choice of human beings to form community for the pursuit and protec-
tion of shared values.3 3 1 There is fate and an authority beyond the
self. There is also freedom and giving rather than owing of allegiance.
The United States of America continues to work with the tension and
may look upon its memory and dreams to consider its current and fu-
ture existence. Indigenous nations should have the same opportunity
to choose freely their response to the quandary of freedom and
solidarity.3 3 2
Race was at one time an important excluding factor in United
States naturalization and was not entirely eliminated until 1952.333
Today few, if any, justifications could be imagined for its return as a
federal citizenship criteria. Nevertheless, federal policy has placed
race at the center of citizenship in Indigenous nations, and many In-
dian nations may view it as a crucial matter of national character. We
believe it is time for Native nations to look to their memory and
dreams to ask questions, to discuss citizenship.
What about old lady Jones celebrating a thirtieth wedding anniver-
sary here in Indian country? What about Sally and Sam, her child
and grandchild, who dance at all the pow-wows? What about Dick and
Jane teaching in the nation's schools for the last ten years? Might an
Indian nation look at residence, character, an oath of allegiance, lan-
guage ability, references from the people, cultural and historical
knowledge, understanding of principles, and realities of attachment to
grant naturalized citizenship?3 3 4 Could there be an adopted clan rela-
tionship so that the people know their relatives? Do the Indian na-
tions ever imagine a person or a family who might be happy to be one
of the people and who the people might be happy to recognize as part
of their relations?
People of the Indian nations may like to believe that their cultures
are distinct and opposed to the greed, individualism, and materialism
of the United States.3 35 Hopefully this may be true, but they need to
move beyond the rhetoric of Indian values and the actions of European
colonialism. When Indigenous nations begin a new discourse on citi-
zenship considering with their memories and dreams whether to allow
331. See supra text accompanying notes 97-106.
332. See generally ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY, 206-216 (1976).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 72.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
335. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 277, 292 (1993).
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some kind of naturalization and on what principles, they should re-
member that race has always been a tool of oppression in the distribu-
tion of scarce resources. "Culture is not genetic and does not come
without effort."336 And, it seems that a kinship community would
hope to develop human beings before capital, and distribute good feel-
ings before material goods.
In the meantime, the Bureau of Indian Affairs is engaged in rule
making to formalize the policy, procedures, and documentation re-
quirements for the filing, processing, issuing, amending and invalidat-
ing of a Certificate of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native Blood.337
336. Id. at 312.
337. Certificate of Degree of Indian or Alaska Native Blood, 65 Fed. Reg. 20,775 (Apr.
18, 2000) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 70); 66 Fed. Reg. 33,654 (June 25, 2001)
(extending comment period on proposal role to Dec. 31, 2001); see also Susan
Shawn Harjo, Vampire Policy is Bleeding Us Dry-Blood Quantums, Begone!, 20
INDAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001, at A5 (expressing discontent with use of
blood quantums).
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